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This dissertation is comprised of three essays.  Chapter One develops a general-
equilibrium framework to address risk-shifting factors in a country allocation of resources 
between the domestic and export sector. The analytical framework introduces credit frictions as 
in Allen and Gale (2000) to the general equilibrium model of Helpman and Razin (1978), which 
features the allocation of factors of production across two sectors of an open economy under 
uncertainty.  The risk bias hinges on the imperfect ability of lenders to monitor the usage of the 
borrowed funds. Borrowers would invest more on the equities of the risky production sector. 
This is because if the returns of those equities are high, they would repay the promised return and 
keep the remaining profits from their investment.  However, if the returns are low, they can just 
default and avoid further losses.  Such risk-shifting behavior, which tends to make the risky 
(export) sector equities overpriced, will lead to also to overinvestment in this sector, and 
excessive allocation of labor to it.  As a result, the production and export pattern to be geared 
towards the risky sector, which may expose a country to increased macroeconomic volatility. 
Chapter Two provides an empirical test to key predictions of the theory, which is 
developed in Chapter One.  Specifically, it uses cross-country panel data to test whether low 
degree of monitoring borrowers by financial intermediaries would contribute to a shift in a 
country’s exports towards risky production sectors.  It analyzed the data measuring the riskiness 
across sectors, developed by Koren and Tenreyro (2007) and Di Giovanni and Levchenko 
(2011), from developed and developing economies over the period of 1978-2004.  The 
explanatory variable of interest is the creditor rights index (CRI) because it captures the degree 
of enforcing debt repayment and thus reflects the lenders’ ability to observe the borrowers’ 
 
 
actions.   The dependent variable is the risk content of exports index, which is constructed by 
multiplying the square of each sector’s share of exports to the variance of the sectoral value 
added growth.  The higher value of the index indicates that a country has higher shares of exports 
in the sectors whose productions are more volatile. Using fixed effects regressions, the results 
revealed that countries where lenders have lower ability to monitor borrowers are the ones with 
higher risk content of exports.  This finding remained robust even after excluding the most 
volatile production sectors from the analysis.  And when separately examining the effects of the 
four different components of creditor rights index, it is shown that the effects of creditor rights 
arises from the restrictions on the borrowers’ filing for reorganization. 
Chapter Three, addressing international equity flows, provides empirical tests to three 
theory-based hypotheses concerning foreign equity investment in the presence of liquidity risk. 
First, the FDI-to-FPI price differential is negatively related to liquidity risk (the "Price Discount 
Hypothesis"). The idea is that direct investments would incur a price discount because market 
participants do not know whether the FDI investor liquidates a firm because of an idiosyncratic 
liquidity shock, or because, as an informed investor, the firm is hit by a productivity shock. 
Second, the FDI-to-FPI composition would skew towards FPI if investors expect to experience 
liquidity shortage in the future (the ""Equity-Composition Hypothesis"). Since direct investments 
are more costly to liquidate, due to the price discount, investors would be inclined to hold less 
FDI if they expect more severe liquidity shock. The third hypothesis, on the other hand, states 
that the FDI-to-FPI composition would skew towards FDI if the past FDI-to-FPI stocks were 
larger (the "Strategic Complementarity Hypothesis").   If the initial proportion of direct 
investments is higher, it is more likely that a direct investment is sold due to liquidity needs.  
This improves the price of the prematurely sold direct investment, creating an incentive for more 
investors to choose FDI rather than FPI.  These hypotheses are examined using the country level 
data consisting of a large set of developed and developing countries over the period 1970 to 
2004. The nationwide sales of external assets are used as a proxy for liquidity problems, and the 
 
 
effect of expected liquidity problems on stock prices, the ratio of FPI to FDI and gross flows of 
FDI and FPI are tested.  The empirical results support the three hypotheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii 
 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
Anuk Serechetapongse was born in December 1984.  She attended Kasetsart University 
Laboratory School, International Program, for her elementary and secondary education where 
she graduated high honor.  She went to further her study at the Bachelor of Arts Program in 
Economics (EBA), Chulalongkorn University where she graduated First Class Honors-Top of 
Class.  She started working as an economist at the Bank of Thailand in 2007.  She was awarded 
the Japan-IMF Scholarship Program (JISP) for Advanced Studies when she first came to the 
Department of Economics at Cornell University.  She was the only Thai who was awarded the 
scholarship since that year.  She earned a Master of Arts degree in Economics in 2011, and her 
Ph.D. was completed in August 2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEDICATION 
 
 iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my beloved Serechetapongse family and Niratisayakul family. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
First, I would like to express my utmost gratitude to the members of my Ph.D. 
committee.  I am immensely indebted to Professor Assaf Razin, my dissertation advisor, who 
had brought me to Cornell five years ago.  I truly thank him for the kindness, invaluable 
guidance, and great opportunities he has given me ever since the first day I met him.  I am deeply 
grateful to Professor Eswar S. Prasad for his advice, understanding, and unceasing supports to 
me throughout the entire process of writing this dissertation and to the start of my career.  I am 
profoundly thankful to Professor Nicholas M. Kiefer for his insightful suggestions as well as his 
continuous efforts to help me with any issues I have brought to him.  It is my honor to have been 
their advisee, for all of them are great models as researchers and teachers. 
I am indebted to Professor Iwan J. Azis, who has been a source of inspiration.   I truly 
appreciate the enormous amount of time he spent in giving me advice regarding being a real 
world economist. I am greatly thankful to Professor John M. Abowd for his considerations about 
my wellbeing, especially in my later years at Cornell.  I also thank Dr. Ayhan Kose for his 
invaluable comments towards the completion of this dissertation. 
I am grateful to the Japan-IMF Scholarship Program (JISP) for Advanced Studies for 
providing me with the generous scholarship throughout the first two years of my graduate studies 
and the valuable opportunity for me to participate in the 2012 internship program at the IMF. 
The unconditional love from my family has always been my encouragement and enables 
me to face all obstacles.  I am most indebted to my mother, Ms. Chularat Niratisayakul, for all of 
her unfathomable dedications to me, particularly for immensely investing in my education and 
for staying with me throughout my entire stay in Cornell.  I am forever indebted to my father, 
Assistant Professor Pravej Serichetaphongse, for his immeasurable devotions and support in my 
education and living, which enable me to fully concentrate in achieving my educational and 
career goals.  
 vi 
 
I am immensely indebted to my uncle, Mr. Prawit Serichetaphongse, for his advice in 
setting my academic and professional goals and his never-ending motivations for me to reach 
them.  I am profoundly gratefully to my grandmother, Ms. Laddawan Siriruthaboot, for her love 
and concerns for me.  I thank my aunt, Mrs. Renu Suvannasarn, for taking care of me ever since 
the first day of my life.  I thank my uncle, Mr. Pongdet Serichetaphongse, for his supports in so 
many ways.  I thank my aunt, Ms. Nillawan Serichetaphongse, for her encouragement.  I thank 
my aunt, Mrs. Nusra Serichetaphongse, for supporting all of my endeavors.  And I thank my 
uncle, Mr. Samran Suvannasarn, for continuously believing in me. 
I am deeply grateful to my grandmother, Mrs. Sriwan Niratisayakul, who has always 
been my moral support.  I thank my aunt and my uncle, Mrs. Darongrat and Mr. Thanes Klahan, 
for standing by my side through all my ups and downs. I thank my aunt and uncle, Mrs. Natthina 
and Mr. Surat Giwarungsawat, for sharing every step of my life from the day I was born. I thank 
my uncle and my aunt, Mr. Manuswee and Mrs. Busakorn Niratisayakul, for their care and 
encouragement.  And I also thank my aunt, Dr. Nuthamon Kongcharoen, for all of the 
considerations she has given me. 
I am blessed to have nine cousins, whom I owe my happiness to: Ms. Runchida 
Suvannasarn, Ms. Thanaporn Klahan, Mr. Peerapat Serichetapongse, Mr. Yossanun 
Giwarungsawat, Mr. Punwipoo Giwarungsawat, Mr. Jirapat Suvannasarn, Ms. Pobsama 
Giwarungsawat, Ms. Isaree Niratisayakul, and Mr. Chayut Niratisayakul. 
My educational and career path would have been very rough without the supports and 
opportunities I have been given before I entered the graduate school.  I am heartily thankful to 
Professor Daniel Ray Lewis, my undergraduate professor in Chulalongkorn University, who is 
my first economics Professor.  I am greatly indebted to Dr. Ampon Kittiampon for giving me an 
opportunity to accompany him during my internship at Thailand’s National Economic and Social 
Development Board when he was the Secretary General, enabling me to obtain first-hand 
experience in the policy-making arena.  I am truly grateful to Dr. Sith Chaisurote, who is the first 
 vii 
 
person that taught me how to conduct an empirical exercise.  I am especially thankful to Dr. 
Kiatipong Ariyapruchya, my undergraduate research advisor and my colleague at the Bank of 
Thailand, for his guidance in my studying and my career path.  I sincerely thank Dr. Piti Disyatat 
for his advice and support in entering the graduate school.  I am also deeply grateful to Dr. 
Kobsak Pootrakul, who always gave me advice and opportunities to learn and grow through all 
the times I worked at the Bank of Thailand.   I am thankful to my supervisors, Dr. Ashvin Ahuja, 
Dr. Yunyong Thaichareon, and Dr. Don Nakornthab, for being my great mentors.  I deeply 
appreciate the help from Dr. Phurichai Rungcharoenkitkul during the whole process of the 
graduate school and scholarship application.  
I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisors at the IMF, Dr. Manmohan Singh 
Kumar and Sheila Bassett, for giving me an invaluable experience during my internship at the 
IMF.   I thank my upperclassmen who are now working at the IMF, Dr. Ding Ding, Dr. Rahul 
Anand, Dr. Koralai Kirabaeva, and Dr. Sonali Das, for giving me advices about completing my 
dissertation and applying to the IMF. 
I would like to extend my most sincere appreciation to Tianli Zhao, who has always 
helped me to get my feet back on the ground, particularly in the critical moments of my 
academic life, from my first year in Cornell all the way to my last year.  I am hugely indebted to 
Dr. Benjarong Suwankiri for his encouragement and advice, especially his suggestions in 
constructing a theoretical framework.  I am deeply thankful to Dr. Tipaluck Krityakierne for her 
huge amount of time spent helping me in model simulation and being my emotional support.  I 
am truly grateful to Sra Chuenchoksan for his invaluable advice in work and in life ever since 
our time at the Bank of Thailand.  I am also greatly thankful to Dr. Chayanee Chawanote for 
accompanying me throughout my time in graduate school and for her help in my empirical test.  
Without them, this dissertation would have never been completed. 
I am grateful to my fellow economics students for their help throughout my years in 
graduate school, particularly during the preparation of the Ph.D. qualifying exams: Sang Wan 
 viii 
 
Yoon, Brock Williams, Zhuo Zhong, Dr. Wei Quan, Dr. John Owsley, Dr. Huimei Delgado, and 
Xin Jin. 
I am fortunate to have friends and seniors who have always supported me academically, 
mentally, and psychologically: Dr. Sutee Anantsuksomsri, Dr. Nij Tontisirin, Dr. Thanasin 
Tanompongphandh, Dr. Supree Srisamran, Dr. Pornphan Banternghansa, Dr. Sommarat 
Chantarat, Dr. Tavan Janvilisri, Dr. Sivalai Khantachavana, Dr. Paitoon Wongsasutthikul, Dr. 
Rujira and Prasit Deewatthanawong, Anutchanat Jaroenjitrkam, Dr. Tae-Hoon Lim, Dr. Samreen 
Malick, Dr. Weishi Gu, and Lei Ye. 
I would like to thank my friends for making my life at Cornell enjoyable: Chirdpan 
Napasawat, Daneeya Bunnag, Hon. Sasitorn Sangchantr, Nuttawit Chobisara, Pinyapat Danutra, 
Pongwut Bumrungsuksawad, Dr. Warut Suampun, Parichart Pimsakul, Liyuan Cui, Dr. 
Nongnuch Athiphunamphai, Tanapong Jiarathanakul, Duangkamon Sangvanich, Pimbucha 
Rusmevichientong, Napat Jatusripitak, Napon Jatusipitak, Chairat Polmuk, Sasima Pongfuengfu, 
Dr. Jeerapond Leelawattanachai, Pakawat Phalitnonkiat, Dr. Kunlaya Soiaporn, Supasorn 
Suwajanakorn, Piyanat Kittiwisit, Adiwid Devahastin Na Ayudha, Bunyarit Meksiriporn, 
Moodjalin Sudcharoen , Papon Luengvarinkul, Chanida Susumpow, Suthinee Buranaphong, 
Chutikan Chaikittiwatana, Porawan Nitjarunkul, and Panpreedee Laohapairoj. 
My internship experience at the IMF has led me to many new friends and colleagues.  I 
am deeply thankful to Dr. Zhennan Li for his help and encouragement during the process of 
applying to the IMF and writing my dissertation.  I am grateful to Dr. Jade Vichyanond and Dr. 
Pakawat Jeasakul for the kindness they have given me throughout my internship.  I also thank 
Nan Qin for encouraging me in completing my project at the IMF as well as my dissertation.  I 
thank Dr. Hamidreza Tabarraei and Tinghui Chen for sharing the internship experience with me. 
I also greatly appreciate the support from my friends from Kasetsart University 
Laboratory School, Chulalongkorn University, and the Bank of Thailand: Porawee Niumsawatt, 
Benjarath Somsuwannakorn, Supannapa Rattanakul Serireungrit, Apinya Jantanyarux, Parkpoom 
 ix 
 
Tilokwan, Waratr Sribunruang, Athsran Aran-angkoon, Natdanai Siriamornkul, Tibadee 
Suraswadi, Theerapat Prayoonrat, Hathaichanok Ananthaweewat, Kris Dacharux, and Natt 
Leelawat. 
Finally, I am most indebted to Dr. Warong Sukchotrat.  His undying love has sheltered 
me from my sadness, and his inexhaustible understanding has supported me in every possible 
way.  The completion of this dissertation would not have been possible without him as the wind 
beneath my wings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 x 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ..................................................................................................... iii 
DEDICATION ........................................................................................................................... iii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .......................................................................................................... v 
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................... xii 
 
CHAPTER 1 ............................................................................................................................... 1 
Risk-Biased Exports: the Role of Creditors’ Protection (A Theoretical Framework) ................ 1 
I. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1 
II. A Model.................................................................................................................................. 3 
1. The Production Sectors ..................................................................................................... 4 
1.1 The Risky Production Sector .................................................................................... 4 
1.2 The Safe Production Sector ...................................................................................... 5 
2. The Household Sectors ..................................................................................................... 6 
2.1 Household Sector: Workers ...................................................................................... 6 
2.2 Household Sector: Entrepreneurs ............................................................................. 7 
3. The Lack of Monitoring Scenario versus the Full Monitoring Scenario .......................... 9 
3.1 The Lack of Monitoring Scenario ............................................................................. 9 
3.2 The Full Monitoring Scenario ................................................................................. 13 
4. Equilibrium ..................................................................................................................... 14 
III. Simulation Results .............................................................................................................. 17 
IV. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 20 
V. References ............................................................................................................................ 22 
 
CHAPTER 2 ............................................................................................................................. 23 
Risk-Biased Exports: the Role of Creditors’ Protection (An Empirical Test) .......................... 23 
I. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 23 
II. Dependent Variable .............................................................................................................. 25 
III. Explanatory Variables ......................................................................................................... 28 
 xi 
 
IV. Results................................................................................................................................. 31 
V. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 32 
VI. APPENDIX A. .................................................................................................................... 34 
VII. References ......................................................................................................................... 45 
 
CHAPTER 3 ............................................................................................................................. 47 
Equity Prices and Equity Flows: Testing Theory of the Information-Efficiency Tradeoff ...... 47 
I. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 47 
II. Adverse-Selection Theory .................................................................................................... 49 
III. Testable Hypotheses ........................................................................................................... 51 
IV. Data ..................................................................................................................................... 52 
V. Measures of Liquidity Crises ............................................................................................... 54 
VI. Estimating the Effect of the Severity of Liquidity Shocks ................................................. 55 
1. Estimating the Effect of a Liquidity Threshold .............................................................. 57 
2. Estimating the Effects of Liquidity Risk on the FDI to FPI Price Discount................... 57 
3. Estimating the Effects of Liquidity Risk on the Composition of Outward FPI to FDI .. 59 
4. Estimating the Effects of Liquidity Risk on the Gross Flows of FDI and FPI ............... 62 
VII. Results ............................................................................................................................... 62 
1. Effects of Liquidity Risk on Stock Prices ....................................................................... 62 
2. Effect of Liquidity Risk on the Composition of Equity Flows ....................................... 63 
3.  Effects of Liquidity Risk on Gross Flows of FDI and FPI ............................................ 65 
VIII. Robustness Tests .............................................................................................................. 66 
1. FDI in the Form of Mergers and Acquisitions ................................................................ 66 
2. Capital Account Openness .............................................................................................. 68 
IX. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 69 
X. Appendix B .......................................................................................................................... 71 
 
 
 
 
 xii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 2.1: Variables and Data Sources ......................................................................................... 34 
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics ...................................................................................................... 34 
Table 2.3: Pair-Wise Correlations ................................................................................................. 34 
Table 2.4: Sector Summary Statistics ........................................................................................... 35 
Table 2.5: Creditor Rights Reforms .............................................................................................. 36 
Table 2.6: Creditor Rights Index and Its Components in 2003 .................................................... 37 
Table 2.7: Regressions of Creditors’ Protection on the Riskiness of Exports .............................. 42 
Table 2.8: Regressions of Creditors’ Protection on the Riskiness of Exports-Excluding 
Petroleum-Related Industries ........................................................................................................ 43 
Table 2.9: Regressions of Creditors’ Protection Components on the Riskiness of Exports ......... 44 
 
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables, Variables of Interest, Instruments, and 
Controls ......................................................................................................................................... 71 
Table 3.2: Pair-Wise Correlations between the Variables of Interest and the Instruments .......... 72 
Table 3.3: The Effect of the Liquidity Crisis on the FDI to FPI Price Ratio (Fixed Effects) ....... 72 
Table 3.4: The Effect of the Liquidity Crisis and the Initial Direct Investment Portion on the FDI 
Price to FPI Price Ratio................................................................................................................. 73 
Table 3.5: The Effect of the Liquidity Crisis on the Outward FPI to FDI Ratio .......................... 74 
Table 3.6: The Effect of Liquidity Crisis and Initial Direct Investment Portion on the Outward 
FPI to FDI Ratio (Fixed Effects) .................................................................................................. 75 
Table 3.7: The Effect of Liquidity Crisis and Initial Direct Investment Portion on the Outward 
FPI to FDI Ratio (Dynamic Panel) ............................................................................................... 76 
Table 3.8: The Effect of the Liquidity Crisis on the Level of the Outward FDI .......................... 77 
Table 3.9: The Effect of Liquidity Crisis on the Level of the Outward FPI ................................. 78 
Table 3.10: The Effect of Liquidity Crisis on the Level of the M&As ........................................ 79 
Table 3.11: The Effect of Liquidity Crisis on the FDI to FPI Price Ratio (Fixed Effects with 
Capital Account Openness)........................................................................................................... 80 
Table 3.12: The Effect of Liquidity Crisis and Initial Direct Investment Portion on the FDI Price 
to FPI Price Ratio (Fixed Effects with Capital Account Openness) ............................................. 81 
Table 3.13: The Effect of Liquidity Crisis on the Outward FPI to FDI Ratio (with Capital 
Account Openness) ....................................................................................................................... 82 
Table 3.14: The Effect of Liquidity Crisis and Initial Direct Investment Portion on the Outward 
FPI to FDI Ratio (Fixed Effects with Capital Account Openness) ............................................... 83 
Table 3.15: The Effect of Liquidity Crisis and Initial Direct Investment Portion on the Outward 
FPI to FDI Ratio (Dynamic Panel with Capital Account Openness)............................................ 84 
Table 3.16: The Effect of Liquidity Crisis on the Level of the Outward FDI (with Capital 
Account Openness) ....................................................................................................................... 85 
 xiii 
 
Table 3.17: The Effect of Liquidity Crisis on the Level of the Outward FPI (with Capital 
Account Openness) ....................................................................................................................... 86 
Table 3.18: The Effect of Liquidity Crisis on the Level of the M&As (with Capital Account 
Openness) ...................................................................................................................................... 87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
Risk-Biased Exports: the Role of Creditors’ Protection (A Theoretical Framework) 
 
I. Introduction 
A number of economic crises, such as the 1997 Asian crisis and the 2007 US crisis, were 
triggered by disruptions in financial markets and overshooting in asset prices.  What could cause 
such overshooting? Also, what are some possible implications of a disruption in financial market 
on the real sector? 
One strand of literature, such as Turnovsky (1974), Helpman and Razin (1978), 
Grossman and Razin (1985), Helpman (1988), and Koren (2003) portrayed the determinants of 
trade patterns under uncertainty.  Recently, Di Giovanni and Levcheko (2011) used the 
framework of Turnovsky (1974) to outline the relationship between comparative advantage and 
exports of a risky good versus a safe good.  However, none of them address the effects of the 
problems in the financial sector, such as when borrowings are not monitored.  Another strand of 
literature, such as Allen and Gale (2000), illustrated the mechanism through which the lack of 
monitoring in the financial sector gives rise to asset price overshooting, but they did not give 
insights about the implications on production and exports.  This paper is one among few papers 
that connect these two strands of literature by combining the real sector framework of Helpman 
and Razin (1978) and the financial sector framework of Allen and Gale (2000) in order to 
investigate the relationship between the ability of lenders to observe borrowers’ usage of funds 
and the export patterns. 
In Helpman and Razin, goods are always traded internationally, but they mentioned both 
when there is no international trade in equities and when equities are traded internationally.  But, 
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like Di Giovanni and Levchenko, this paper only explores a case when there is an international 
trade in goods but not in equities.   As explained in Di Giovanni and Levchenko, it is still valid to 
consider this case since there is no strong empirical evidence for international risk sharing via 
financial liberalization.   
Nevertheless, the driving mechanism of a model in this paper is different from that of Di 
Giovanni and Levchenko.  In their framework, production diversification serves as a mean of 
risk diversification.  Thus, shifting the joint probability distribution of the productivity shocks by 
preserving the spreads but changing the mean of the shocks in favor of one sector (thereby 
increasing its comparative advantage) would increase the production of that sector.  In contrast, 
the production pattern in this paper’s framework is driven by the risk-shifting behavior that 
occurs due to the lack of monitoring in the borrowing usage.   
Such mechanism is adopted from Allen and Gale (2000).  In their model, investors 
borrow from banks to invest in the safe and the risky assets.  While the safe asset is in variable 
supply and provides a stable return, the risky asset is in fixed supply and provides a random 
return. It is assumed that banks do not know how to invest in the safe and risky assets, so they 
have no choice but to lend to investors, and they cannot observe the investment decisions of 
investors after lending.  Also, banks and investors cannot condition to terms of the loan on the 
size of the loan or on asset returns, which caused them to use simple debt contract only.  The 
assumption that banks cannot monitor the investors’ usage of borrowing would give rise to the 
risk shifting behavior among investors.  If their portfolio value is insufficient for repayment, they 
can just declare bankruptcy and avoid further loss.  But if their portfolio value turns out to be 
high, they would just repay the bank the promised return and keep the rest of the proceeds.  
Thus, investors would substitute towards the risky asset.  And since the risky asset is in the fixed 
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supply, the higher demand from investors would bid up the price of the risky asset to be above its 
fundamental value.  
This chapter extends the partial equilibrium model in Allen and Gale (2000) to the 
general equilibrium set-up and uses the similar mechanism described above to illustrate the 
effects of the lack of monitoring in the borrowing usage on asset price as well as on production 
and exports
1
. 
From a theoretical framework, this paper hypothesizes that when investors cannot be 
fully monitored, they could engage in risk-shifting behavior in asset market, resulting in asset 
price overshooting.  Investor’s risk-shifting behavior would at the same time increase investment 
in a production sector that is more susceptible to shocks, pushing up the production and exports 
in such sector. An empirical test in the next paper also supports that countries with lower degree 
of creditors’ protection are the ones whose exports are more geared towards sectors with higher 
volatility in production.  This could lead to a possible policy implication that countries with weak 
supervision in financial sector and more likely to experience higher output volatility. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follow.  Section II describes a theoretical model, 
Section III reveals the results from simulations, and Section IV concludes.  
 
II. A Model 
To investigate a possible linkage between the real sector and the financial sector, the real 
sector framework of Helpman and Razin (1978) and the financial sector framework of Allen and 
Gale (2000) are combined to form a 2-period, 2-sectors, small open economy model.   The 
                                                 
1 The model in this chapter relaxes the assumptions in Allen and Gale (2000) that investors are risk neutral and that there is a 
non-pecuniary cost which restricts the size of investment. 
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production of the first sector, the risky sector, is subject to a productivity shock, whereas the 
production of the second sector, the safe sector is not. The price of the safe good is normalized to 
1, so the price of the risky good, denoted by P, captures the relative price of risky good to safe 
good.  There is an international trade in both goods, causing the price of goods to be exogenous.  
However, there is no international trade in stocks. 
 
1. The Production Sectors 
There are two production sectors, the risky sector and the safe sector.  They use labor and 
capital to produce and issue stocks in the first period.  Then they sell output and provide returns 
to stockholders in the second period. 
 
1.1 The Risky Production Sector 
The production of the first sector, the risky sector, is subject to a random productivity 
shock.  The actual output of the risky sector is 
θZ = θF(LZ,KZ) 
where the subscript  Z denotes the risky production sector.   In the above equation, Z = F(LZ,KZ) 
is a standard homogenous of degree one production function. LZ and KZ are the labor and capital 
input for the risky sector, respectively.  The variable θ is a random variable with a continuous 
positive density h(θ) on the support [0, θMAX] and mean   .  The random productivity shock θ is 
common knowledge, and the actual value of θ will realize in the second period. 
Before the productivity shock realizes, the optimal amount of both factors of production 
must be chosen in the first period.  The producers of the risky good also issue “real equities”, or 
stocks, to finance their factor costs. (A real equity from the risky sector will be called a risky 
 5 
 
equity.)  A unit of risky equity in the first period provides a basket of (θ(1), θ(2),…..) units of 
risky good, covering all states of nature.  
Since firms choose factor input before the realization of productivity shock, their 
optimization can be done via maximizing their stock market value (maximizing their stock 
market value is equivalent to maximizing their profits if there is no productivity shock).  Thus, 
the firms’ optimization problem can be written as follow 
                          max qZ – RZKZ – WZLZ = max q F(LZ,KZ) – RZKZ – WZLZ  
where q is the selling price of a risky equity, and Z can also be seen as the total amount of issued 
risky equities. RZ is the rental rate and the WZ is the wage rate offered by the risky sector.   
In the second period after the productivity shock realizes, a holder of one unit of risky 
equity will be given θ units of risky good as a return, and the monetary value of such return is 
Pθ. 
 
1.2 The Safe Production Sector 
In contrast, the production of the second sector, the safe sector, is not subject to a 
productivity shock.  Therefore, the profit maximization for firms in the safe sector can be written 
as follow 
max X – RXKX – WXLX = max Q(LX,KX) – RXKX – WXLX 
where the subscript X denotes the safe production sector.   In the above equation, X = Q(LX,KX) is 
a standard homogenous of degree one production function with labor input LX and capital input 
KX.  Note that the price of the safe good is normalized to 1. RX is the rental rate and the WX is the 
wage rate offered by the safe sector. 
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Like firms in the risky sector, firms in the safe sector issue real equities to finance their 
factor costs.  Because there is no productivity shock in the safe sector, the above profit 
maximization problem can also be viewed as stock market value maximization problem.  It can 
be interpreted that the selling price of each unit of real equity for the safe sector (henceforth, safe 
equity) is normalized to 1.   
Because the production of a safe sector is not subject to shocks, safe equity yields a 
constant return in all states of nature. The return on each unit of safe equity equals the marginal 
product of capital, R2, which is equal to the depreciation rate plus the risk-free interest rate r.  It 
is assumed further that the depreciation rate is zero, so each unit of safe equity provides a 
constant return of r units of safe good in the second period.  
 
2. The Household Sectors 
There are two types of households, workers and entrepreneurs, both of which will 
consume only in the second period.  Workers, which have no access to the stock market, supply 
the loans by depositing their labor income in the banks.  In contrast, entrepreneurs are the ones 
who have access to the stock market and demand loan.  Thus, they will play an important role in 
determining the price of real equities as well as resource allocations among production sectors.  
This is different from the set-up in Allen and Gale (2000) where there are investors and banks 
but the source of the banks’ funds is not mentioned. 
 
2.1 Household Sector: Workers 
In the first period, workers are endowed with total amount of labor   , so they will earn 
labor income from allocating their labor endowment between the risky sector and the safe sector.  
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Because they want to maximize their income for their second-period consumption but have no 
access to the stock market, they will deposit all their labor income, WZ LZ + WXLX, in a bank in 
the first period to get the second-period return r(WZ LZ + WXLX), where r is the interest rate.  As a 
result, the labor income becomes the supply of loans available for borrowing. 
 
2.2 Household Sector: Entrepreneurs 
In the first period, entrepreneurs are endowed with total amount of capital   , which 
would be allocated between the risky sector and the safe sector. They also own the firms in the 
two production sectors (by holding all initial real equities) and borrow from banks to invest in 
the real equities issued by both.  
As for the relationship between borrowers and lenders, which in this case are 
entrepreneurs and banks, the following assumptions in Allen and Gale (2000) are employed to 
make the interaction between the risk-shifting behavior, asset price, and the real sector as clear as 
possible.  
a. Banks are risk neutral. 
b. Banks do not know how to invest in the safe and risky equities by themselves, so they 
have no alternatives other than lending to entrepreneurs. 
c. Banks and entrepreneurs can only use simple debt contract.  That is, they cannot 
condition the terms of borrowing based on the size of borrowing or on asset returns. 
d. Entrepreneurs do not need collateral to borrow from banks 
The first assumption is present in order for banks not to have preference towards or away 
from risk.  The second assumption prevents banks from investing on their own.  Hence, the 
actions of entrepreneurs can be observed more clearly. 
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Because the terms of loans are not conditioned on the loan size or asset returns, 
entrepreneurs can borrow as much as they want at the going lending interest rate.  Then, in 
equilibrium, the lending interest rate would be equal to the risk-free interest rate, which is the 
return on the safe equity.  If the lending interest rate is lower than the risk-free interest rate, 
entrepreneurs’ demand for loans would be infinite.  If the lending interest rate is higher, they will 
not invest in the safe asset at all.  In other words, the demand for loans is perfectly elastic. 
Finally, since all the loans are non-collateral loans, banks can only claim the returns on 
entrepreneurs’ portfolio performance but cannot go after their income from other sources, such 
as their income from endowment
2
. 
Entrepreneurs’ first period budget constraint can therefore be written as follow:  
x + qz ≤ (qZ – RZKZ – WZLZ) + (X – RXKX – WXLX) + WZLZ + WXLX 
where x is the quantity of safe sector real equities purchased by entrepreneurs.  Since the unit 
price of a safe sector real equity is 1, x also represents the total value of the purchased safe sector 
real equities.  Similarly, z is the quantity of risky sector real equities purchased by entrepreneurs, 
so qz is the total value of the purchased risky sector.  On the right hand side, (qZ – RZKZ – WZLZ) 
and (X – RXKX – WXLX) are the net values from their ownership of firms in the risky and the safe 
industries. The amount WZLZ + WXLX, which is the deposited labor income, becomes the total 
amount of loans given to entrepreneurs. 
In the second period, entrepreneurs would receive the rent on their capital endowment 
(RZKZ from the risky sector and RXKX from the safe sector) and the return on their holdings of 
risky equities and safe equities.  Following that the monetary return per unit of risky equity is Pθ 
and the monetary return per unit of safe equity is r, the total return on entrepreneurs’ portfolio is 
                                                 
2 This assumption also prevents entrepreneurs’ consumption to be equal to zero in the case that they default. 
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Pθz + rx 
Because the safe equities provide constant return in all states of nature, the outcome of 
entrepreneurs’ portfolio would depend on the performance of the risky equities.  Then 
entrepreneurs would repay to banks r(WZLZ + WXLX ) ,which is the total amount of borrowing 
multiplied by the risk-free interest rate, before choosing the level of consumption.  Nevertheless, 
the choices of investment and loan repayment made by entrepreneurs as well as the choices of 
consumption made by both entrepreneurs and workers hinge upon whether entrepreneurs’ 
investment decisions can be monitored.  This would also affect the price of the real equities and 
the actual productions of the real sectors. 
 
3. The Lack of Monitoring Scenario versus the Full Monitoring Scenario 
3.1 The Lack of Monitoring Scenario 
This scenario illustrates the event when banks cannot monitor entrepreneurs’ usage of 
borrowings, which would be followed by the risk-shifting behavior among entrepreneurs.  If the 
productivity realization and hence the return on risky equities is high, entrepreneurs can repay 
the banks a promised return and keep the remaining proceeds from their portfolio.  If the 
productivity realization is low and their portfolio values are insufficient to repay the bank, 
however, entrepreneurs would repay only the proceeds from their portfolio without bearing any 
further cost.  This would encourage entrepreneurs to demand more risky equities, because they 
have more to gain on the upside risk and less to lose on the downside risk from investing in risky 
equities. 
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The entrepreneurs’ optimization problem is to choose their capital allocations and 
portfolio allocations in the first period and then choose their consumption in the second period.  
This problem can be solved backward. 
In the second period, entrepreneurs receive   
   
     
    
  from renting capital to the two 
production sectors and get a total return of     
    
   
  from their portfolio.  Then they must 
repay the amount   
    
   
     
    
   to the banks. This causes their total second-period income 
to be 
  
   
     
    
        
    
   
      
    
   
     
    
   
where the superscript l indicates the lack of monitoring scenario.  If the return on their portfolio 
is high, the above expression is positive because entrepreneurs would still earn positive profits 
even after repaying the banks.   
If, on the other hand, the return on entrepreneurs’ portfolio becomes insufficient for 
repayment, they would default and only pay the banks the total proceeds of their 
portfolio,     
    
   
 , so their total second-period income equals 
  
   
     
    
  
Formally, entrepreneurs’ second period maximization problem in the lack of monitoring 
scenario can be written as follow: 
                     
        
        
    ) 
subject to 
    
         
            
   
     
    
    
                                                
   
     
    
        
    
   
      
    
   
     
    
     
 11 
 
Entrepreneurs maximize their utility by choosing their consumption of the risky good 
(   
    ) and of the safe good (   
    ) subject to their total income, which depends on their 
choice whether to default. 
There exists a productivity shock realization θ* such that entrepreneurs’ income when 
default and not default are equated. 
  
   
     
    
         
    
   
      
    
   
     
    
      
   
     
    
    
Rearranging the above equation yields 
     
    
   
      
    
   
     
    
   = 0 
Hence, θ* is the threshold value of θ below which entrepreneurs will default on their loans. 
As a result, entrepreneurs’ first-period maximization problem is as follow: 
                   
            
   
     
    
         
  
 
 
                        
   
     
    
        
    
   
      
    
   
     
    
         
    
  
 
subject to 
x
l
 + q
l
 z
l
 ≤ ( q l Zl – RZ
l
 KZ
l
 – WZ 
l
 LZ
l
) + (X
l
 – RX 
l
KX
l
 – WX 
l
 LX
l
) + WZ 
l
 LZ
l
 + WX 
l
 LX
l
 
In the first period, entrepreneurs choose their allocation of capital among the two production 
sectors as well as their holdings of risky and safe equities to maximize their expected utility 
subject to their first-period budget constraint determined by the net values of their initial stock 
holdings and their borrowing from banks.   
If entrepreneurs’ usage of borrowing is not monitored, they would default when θ is 
lower than the threshold value θ*, so the expected return per one unit of loan would be 
rPr(θ > θ*) +   
    
    
   
 
  
   
    
    
         
  
 
 <r 
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It is observable that the expected return per one unit of loan will always be less than the 
contracted risk-free rate. Such difference can be viewed as an informational rent that 
entrepreneurs reap from workers, who are depositors, because they can hide their investment 
choices from banks. 
As for workers, they will receive from banks the whole return on their deposits, 
  
    
   
     
    
  , in the case of high productivity realization, and the proceeds     
    
   
  
that is less than   
    
   
     
    
   in the case of low productivity realization.  Thus, their 
second-period utility maximization can be written as  
                     
        
        
    ) 
subject to 
    
         
              
    
   
        
   
     
    
     
Workers maximize their utility by choosing their consumption of the risky good (   
     ) and of 
the safe good (   
    ) subject to their total return on their deposits, which, again, depends on 
entrepreneurs’ choice whether to default. 
And their first-period maximization problem is 
             
              
    
   
                    
    
   
     
    
         
    
  
  
 
 
subject to 
       
      
  
where workers choose their allocation of labor to maximize their expected utility subject to their 
resource constraint. 
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3.2 The Full Monitoring Scenario 
The purpose of this scenario is to portray the fundamental value of the risky equity, which would 
serve as the benchmark to compare and tell whether the price of risky equity is overshooting.  
According to Allen and Gale (2000), the fundamental value is defined as the value that 
entrepreneurs would be willing to pay for one unit of risky equity if there is no risk shifting, all 
else equal
3.  This would occur if banks can fully monitor entrepreneurs’ investment decisions.  
Therefore, entrepreneurs will repay in full regardless of the productivity shock realization. 
Entrepreneurs’ second-period maximization problem in this scenario is the following: 
   
   
        
       
        
        
    ) 
subject to 
    
         
        
   
     
    
        
     
   
      
    
   
     
    
    
Hence, their maximization problem in the first period is as follow: 
   
  
 
  
 
    
    
   
    
    
   
     
    
        
     
   
  
    
    
   
     
    
  
       
    
 
 
subject to 
x
f
 + q
f
 z
f
 ≤ ( q f Zf – RZ
f
 KZ
f
 – WZ 
f
 LZ
f
) + (X
f
 – RX 
f
KX
f
 – WX 
f
 LX
f
) + WZ 
f
 LZ
f
 + WX 
f
 LX
f
 
The superscript f denotes the full monitoring scenario. 
The only difference between these maximization problems and the ones in the lack of monitoring 
scenario is that now there is no possibility of default. 
                                                 
3 Allen and Gale (2000) also interpret the full monitoring scenario as a case that reveals the price of risky equity entrepreneurs are 
willing to pay if they use their own funds.  Then they conjectured that if such entrepreneurs are introduced in the model, these 
entrepreneurs would hold less of the risky equity or even short the risky equity, depending on how risk-averse they are and on 
how severe the risk-shifting problem is.  In order for asset price overshooting and the overinvestment in the risky sector to take 
place, there must be limitations on short sales of the assets. 
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Since entrepreneurs always repay to banks in full, workers will also get from banks the 
full return on their deposits, causing workers’ second-period maximization problem to be 
   
   
        
       
        
        
    ) 
subject to 
    
         
        
    
   
     
    
    
And their first-period maximization problem is 
   
  
 
   
 
   
      
    
   
     
    
         
    
 
 
subject to 
        
      
 
 
4. Equilibrium  
In equilibrium, all domestic markets have to clear.  The market-clearing conditions for labor and 
capital can be written as follow 
      
     
 
 
       
     
 
 
The superscript j = l, f denotes the lack of monitoring scenario or the full monitoring scenario. 
Because there is no international trade in real equities, the market-clearing condition for risky 
equities is  
z
j
 = Z
j
 = F(LZ
j
,KZ
j
) 
where the right-hand side is the demand for risky equities and the left-hand side is the supply of 
risky equities. 
Similarly, the market-clearing condition for safe equities is  
x
j
 =X 
j
 = Q(LX
j
,KX
j
) 
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where the right-hand side is the demand for safe equities and the left-hand side is the supply of 
safe equities
4
. 
No-arbitrage condition implies that the wage rates and the rental rates offered by the risky sector 
and the safe sector must equalize.  Hence,  
  
      
    , and   
      
     
The rental rate is equal to the sum of the interest rate and the rate of depreciation.  It is further 
assumed that the rate of depreciation is zero, so 
       
In addition, a production sector is in equilibrium if the net stock market value cannot be altered 
by varying its input levels.  Thus, in an equilibrium in which all sectors produce a finite output 
level, 
  
     
    
  
   
 
    
  
     
    
  
   
 
    
     
    
  
   
 
    
     
    
  
   
 
    
                                                 
4 This element is different from Allen and Gale (2000).  In their partial equilibrium set-up, the supply of the risky equities is fixed 
at a certain value and the supply of the safe equities is determined by investors’ decisions to invest in capital goods. 
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The first two equations are the first order conditions of firms in the risky industry, and the 
latter two are those of firms in the safe industry.  Because     
    
   is homogenous of degree 1, 
multiplying   
     
 
  
 
 
   
   
  by   
 
 and   
     
 
  
 
 
   
   
  by   
 
 and adding them up yields 
             
    
        
       
 
 
Since     
    
   is also homogenous of degree 1, repeating the same steps using the first order 
conditions of the safe sector yields 
       
    
        
       
 
 
This implies that the net values of owning the firms (net value of holding initial stocks) in both 
industries are zero.  Using the above result and the no-arbitrage condition, the entrepreneurs’ 
first-period budget constraint can be re-written as 
x
j
 + q
j
 z
j
 = w
j   
Then, when entrepreneurs’ usage of borrowings cannot be monitored, the threshold value of 
productivity shock below which entrepreneurs will default (θ*) can be re-written as 
Pθ*zl +rlxl – rlw l   = Pθ*zl +rlxl – rl(xl +qlzl) = 0 
θ* = rlql/P 
This means that the threshold value is positively related to the risk-free interest rate and the price 
of risky equity and is negatively related to the price of risky good.  Thus, the higher price of the 
risky equity will push up the threshold value, increasing the likelihood the entrepreneurs will 
default. 
Using the re-written first period budget constraint, the market clearing conditions, and the 
no-arbitrage conditions, the first order conditions of entrepreneurs’ first period maximization 
when they cannot be monitored is 
 17 
 
                 
    
   
      
                  
        
    
  
0 
The above equation will give the price of the risky equity when risk-shifting takes place. 
Similarly, the first order conditions of entrepreneurs’ first period maximization when they can be 
fully monitored is 
                 
    
       
                  
        
    
 
0 
This equation will determine the fundamental price of the risky equity when there is no risk-
shifting.   
After the productivity shock realizes, the actual production level of risky good as well as 
the return on risky equity are determined.  Then entrepreneurs and workers would choose their 
consumption of the safe and the risky goods.  A good will be exported if the production level 
exceeds total consumption, and will be imported otherwise.  Nevertheless, since there is no 
international trade in equities, the value of exports of one good must be equal to the value of 
imports of another good. 
 
III. Simulation Results  
The simulation results are shown in the figures below.  Figure 1 reveals that the price of 
the risky sector’s real equity is higher in the lack of monitoring scenario compared with its 
fundamental value in the full monitoring scenario.  This result is in line with that of Allen and 
Gale (2000).  Figure 2 illustrates that the production of the risky sector in the lack of monitoring 
scenario is higher than that in the full monitoring scenario.  Moreover, the higher price of the 
risky sector’s real equity and the higher production of the risky sector are associated with the 
higher price of the risky good.  Finally, Figures 3 and 4 show that the volume and the value of 
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Figure 1: Price of Risky Equity
Price of Risky Good
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exports in the risky sector in the lack of monitoring scenario is higher than that in the full 
monitoring scenario.  (Also, exports increase with higher productivity shock.) 
The mechanism behind these results can be explained as follow.  When borrowers, which 
in this case are entrepreneurs, cannot be fully monitored and thus can default, they would gear 
their investments towards the risky production sector by investing more in risky equities, given 
that they provide higher expected return compared with safe equities.  This would bid up the 
price of risky equities in the low-quality credit market scenario to be higher than in the high-
quality credit market scenario.  At the same time, as entrepreneurs invest more in risky equities, 
the risky sector would receive higher level of investment, resulting in the higher production and 
export levels.   
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IV. Conclusion  
The important element of this model is the risk-shifting behavior of borrowers, which 
was caused by the lack of monitoring in the borrowing usage.  The effects of such behavior in 
the financial sector is transmitted to the real sector via the surge in the demand to invest in the 
risky sector that pushes up the price of the risky equity and therefore increase the investment into 
the risky sector.   
The model in this chapter focuses on the results from the inability of the lenders to 
observe the borrowers’ investment decision in the lack of monitoring scenario.  In doing so, the 
full monitoring scenario is used as a benchmark to observe whether asset price overshoots and 
whether overinvestment in the risky sector occurs.  However, it is an extreme case and hardly 
exists in reality, because the main reason banks are lending is that they still rely on 
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entrepreneurs’ private information about investment.  If banks have sufficient information to 
invest in the safe and the risky assets, they would have invested by themselves and not lend to 
entrepreneurs.  Hence, entrepreneurs could appropriate from banks a certain level of 
informational rent.  On the other hand, if entrepreneurs have sufficient funding, they would not 
have to borrow from banks in the first place. 
Another question which could be raised is that, besides the lack of monitoring, limited 
liability is another feature of the model that would also contribute to the risk-shifting behavior.  
This is because the limited liability assumption prevents the banks from seizing anything else 
other than entrepreneurs’ portfolio return, thereby protecting entrepreneurs from further loss 
when their investment turns sour. This leads to another question: what would happen if 
entrepreneurs have to put collaterals in order to borrow from banks?  In other words, what would 
happen if the limited liability assumption were relaxed?  Depending on their degree of risk 
aversion and on the size of the collateral, such entrepreneurs would hold less of the risky 
equities, lowering the degree of asset price overshooting and thus the extent of overinvestment in 
the risky sector.  Nevertheless, the main results following the risk-shifting behavior when 
entrepreneurs are not monitored would still prevail.  
In sum, the combination of the real sector framework and the financial sector framework 
in this model enables the analysis of the linkage between a country’s degree of monitoring on the 
borrowing usage and the riskiness of exports.  It hypothesized that the price of the risky equity, 
the production in the risky sector, and exports of the risky sector are higher when the borrowers’ 
investment decisions cannot be monitored.  An empirical test for this hypothesis is presented in 
the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Risk-Biased Exports: the Role of Creditors’ Protection (An Empirical Test) 
 
I. Introduction 
What are the possible ways that the financial sector and the real sector are connected?  
What could be the effects of the disruption in the financial sector on the real sector?   
The previous chapter modeled a channel through which a country’s degree of monitoring 
in the financial sector would influence the real economy.  By combining the real sector 
framework of Helpman and Razin (1978) and the financial sector framework of Allen and Gale 
(2000), it portrayed that the lack of monitoring on the borrowing usage would encourage risk-
shifting behavior, causing overinvestment in the risky production sector that is more susceptible 
to shocks.  As a result, the price of the risky stocks as well as the production and exports of the 
risky sector will rise.  Such higher exports in the risky sector may cause a country to face 
increased macroeconomic volatility (OECD (2006), Caballero and Cowan (2007), and Koren and 
Tenreyro (2007)).   
This chapter provides an empirical test on whether the low degree of monitoring would 
gear a country’s exports towards risky production sectors. 
One of the challenges in conducting this empirical exercise is finding a proxy for the 
riskiness of a country’s exports.  Before doing so, it is necessary to identify which production 
sectors are risky.  Koren and Tenreyro (2007) measured the intrinsic volatility of different 
sectors using the variance of the sectoral value added growth.  The riskier sectors are the ones 
with higher intrinsic volatility.   From the method of Koren and Tenreyro (2007), Di Giovanni 
and Levchenko (2011) developed the measure of a country’s export riskiness, which is called the 
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risk content of exports, by multiplying the square of each sector’s share of exports to the intrinsic 
sectoral volatility.    The risk content of exports can thus be viewed as the variance of export 
patterns.  A country’s exports riskiness would rise when its export pattern is tilted towards 
sectors with high intrinsic volatility.  
Another challenge of this empirical test is measuring how well the borrowing usage is 
monitored. The previous chapter modeled the degree of monitoring in the following way.  If the 
borrowing usage is poorly monitored, lenders may not be fully repaid.  In contrast, if the 
borrowing usage is fully monitored, lenders are always repaid fully.  Thus, an empirical proxy 
should be able to capture whether it is easy for lenders to be repaid. La Porta, Lopes-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1996) (henceforth LLSV (1996)) developed a de jure measure called the 
creditor rights index (CRI), which accesses the four aspects of creditors’ legal rights against 
defaulting debtors.  Such legal rights would become stronger when there are restrictions on the 
borrowers’ filing for reorganization, when secured creditors can possess their security right after 
the approval of the reorganization petition, when secured creditors can first gain the proceeds 
from a bankrupt debtor, and when debtor can no longer administer their properties pending the 
resolution of the reorganization.  Djankov et al (2007) extended the data of LLSV 1996 to cover 
from 49 countries to 129 countries from 1978 to 2004.  This chapter will use the CRI data from 
Djankov et al (2007) as a proxy for the degree of monitoring.  Not only is this measure in line 
with the previous chapter’s theoretical set-up, but the extended data set would also allow for time 
series variation
5
. 
Many studies have explored the importance of creditors’ rights in various aspects.  For 
instance, LLSV (1997) examined the impacts of creditors’ power on the size and the depth of the 
                                                 
5 Other variables, such as contract enforcement, do not have long data series. 
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bond markets and the stock markets.  Djankov et al (2007) investigated how creditors’ power 
affects the extent of credits to the economy.  Acharya, Amihud, and Litov (2011) studied the 
relationship between creditors’ rights and corporate risk-taking behavior and corporate leverage.  
Hale, Razin, and Tong (2012) provided insights on the effects of creditor rights on stock prices in 
the face of liquidity crises.  Nevertheless, none of these literature have linked the riskiness of 
exports with creditors’ rights. 
An empirical test in this chapter analyzed the data of the risk content of exports and 
creditor rights index from developed and developing economies over the period of 1978-2004.   
Using fixed effects regressions, the results revealed that countries with poorer creditor rights are 
the ones with higher risk content of exports.  This finding remained robust even after excluding 
the most volatile production sectors from the analysis.  And when separately examining the 
effects of the four different components of creditor rights index, it is shown that the effects of 
creditor rights arises from the restrictions on the borrowers’ filing for reorganization. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  Sections II and III explain more 
about the dependent variable and the explanatory variables, respectively. Section IV reveals the 
results, and Section V concludes. 
 
II. Dependent Variable 
A dependent variable for this empirical exercise is Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2011)’s 
risk content of exports, which aims to capture export volatility.  The rationale behind the 
construction of this index is that a country’s export volatility can be broken down into two parts, 
the intrinsic volatility of each sector and a country’s share of exports in each sector. 
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This chapter follows the steps in Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2011) to obtain the data of 
the sectoral value added growth.  The value added data of the 28 manufacturing sectors come 
from the UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database, which reports the data using the 3-digit ISIC 
Revision 3 classification.  In addition, the value added in agriculture (short for Agriculture, 
Hunting, Forestry and Fishing) and mining (short for Mining and Quarrying) sectors come from 
the United Nations National Accounts Official Country Data.  Hence there are a total of 30 
production sectors.  The value added data were originally reported in current U.S. dollars, and 
they are converted into constant international dollars using the Penn World Tables. 
The data of the countries’ sectoral exports to the rest of the world come from the UN 
Comtrade Database, which reports the data according to the 4-digit SITC Revision 2 
classification.  Hence, the sectoral exports data are converted into the 3-digit ISIC Revision 3 
classification using the tables provided in M. Affendy, Yee, and Satoru (2010). 
First, the sectoral intrinsic volatility is calculated using the method similar to Koren and 
Tenreyro (2007).  Define      as the value added growth, which reflects innovations to the value 
added, in country c, sector i, and time t.  To control for the cross-country long-run differences in 
the value added growth, the series      is subtracted by the mean growth rate for each country 
and sector over the entire time period.  The demeaned value added growth is denoted as     , and 
it can be seen as the sector-specific shock for each country and each year. 
            
 
 
     
 
   
  
Then a global shock for sector i and time t, denoted as    , is calculated by averaging the series 
     across countries for each sector and each year. 
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After obtaining the global sector-specific shock    , the sample variance of this series is 
computed.  Such variance is used as a measure of the sectoral intrinsic volatility. 
  
    
 
   
           
 
 
   
 
The sample covariance between     and    , which captures how shocks of different sectors 
covary, is also computed for each pair of different sectors i and j. 
      
 
   
                     
 
   
 
Repeating this procedure for all the 30 production sectors gives the 30x30 variance-covariance 
matrix, which will be denoted as ∑.  By construction, ∑ is country and time invariant. 
Table 4 summarized the summary statistics of the growth in value added for each industry.  The 
square of the reported standard deviation is equal to the diagonal of ∑.  Miscellaneous petroleum 
and coal products industry is the one with the highest variance, followed by other manufactured 
products.  The industries with the lowest variance are mining and agriculture
6
. 
Afterwards, for different countries and years, each of the thirty industry’s share of export 
to total exports,     
 , is constructed and regrouped to form a 30x1 vector denoted as     
 .  
Finally, the risk content of export index is calculated as follow: 
                    
 ∑    
  
This is a composite index for each country and each year.  The higher magnitude of the risk 
content of exports indicates that a country has higher exports in sectors with higher volatility in 
                                                 
6 This finding still holds after excluding outliers in the miscellaneous petroleum and coal products sector. 
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production.  In addition, since the sectoral intrinsic volatility is country and time invariant, the 
cross-country differences of this index comes solely from the difference in export patterns. 
 
III. Explanatory Variables 
The explanatory variable of interest is an empirical proxy that captures the degree of 
enforcing debt repayment, which would reflect the degree of monitoring the borrowing usage.  
The creditor rights index (CRI) will be used as such proxy, because it measures whether creditors 
can more easily force repayment, grab collateral, or gain control of the debtors’ assets.   
The CRI was first proposed by LLSV (1996) and later extended by Djankov et al (2007). 
It was constructed during January of every year.  First, the bankruptcy and bankruptcy-related 
laws were reviewed to identify major reforms and assess the impacts of such reforms on the CRI.  
Then the local bankruptcy lawyers were surveyed to confirm or amend the timing of reforms and 
their impacts. 
The index takes the values from 0 to 4.  One additional point is added if a country’s law 
and regulations contains each of these four aspects of creditors’ power in bankruptcy.   
a.  Restrictions on reorganization filing 
In some countries, debtors can unilaterally seek protection from creditors by filing for 
reorganization without creditor consent.  If this is the case, creditors can, at best, get their money 
or collateral with a delay.  Thus, restrictions on reorganization filing, such as the creditor consent 
or minimum dividends, would make it more difficult for debtors to escape creditors’ demands. 
b. The lack of automatic stay or asset freeze 
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Automatic stay prevents creditors from repossessing the loan collateral, thereby protecting 
debtors. If there is no automatic stay, creditors can pull collateral even before the completion of 
reorganization. 
c. Priority for secured creditors to gain before other entities the proceeds from asset 
disposition 
In countries where creditors were repaid after other entities, they could be left with no assets to 
back up their claims.   An example would be Mexico, where secured creditors were repaid after 
various social constituencies.  Providing such priority would strengthen creditor rights. 
d. Prohibition of management to administer the properties pending the resolution of 
reorganization 
In some countries, such as Malaysia, management (debtor) is replaced by a party appointed by 
the court or creditors.  This threat of dismissal may improve creditors’ power. 
The higher the index, the stronger the protection of creditors. 
Since 1978, there have been a total of 162 reforms across 99 countries, but only 32 
reforms in 25 countries affect the CRI.  The years and countries in which those reforms took 
place and their impacts on the CRI are summarized in Table 2.5. 
Table 2.6 shows the CRI and its components of various countries in 2003.  There is a mix 
of advanced economies and emerging markets and developing countries that obtain each of the 
different scores from 0 to 4.  Very similar pattern also appear on other years because of the 
infrequent time series variation.  LLSV (1996) as well as Djankov et al. (2007) documented that 
the CRI scores varies systematically across legal origins.  Economies that are of English 
common law legal origin, such as the United Kingdom and Hong Kong, tend to have the highest 
CRI.  As for countries that are of German civil law legal origin (such as Germany, Japan, South 
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Korea, and Switzerland) and of Nordic legal origin, their CRI tend to be intermediate.  Finally, 
CRI is the lowest among French civil law countries. 
The control variables include the share of a country’s share of inward foreign direct 
investment (FDI) to the world’s total FDI, the per capita GDP in constant dollar, a measure of 
trade openness, and a measure of financial openness.  A country’s share of inward FDI to the 
world’s total FDI captures the global allocation of investment through foreign direct investment, 
which could affect a country’s overall production capacity. Similar to Di Giovanni and 
Levchenko, the per capita GDP and its square divided by 100 are included to control for the non-
linear effect of country’s size.  The trade openness measure, which is the natural log of total 
exports plus total imports to GDP, captures a country’s degree of trade integration, which could 
potentially affect its production specialization pattern.  While Di Giovanni and Levchenko used a 
de facto measure of financial openness (total external assets plus total external liabilities divided 
by GDP), this paper used Chinn-Ito’s de jure financial openness index instead since the share of 
inward FDI is already included in a regression. The Chinn-Ito financial openness index is 
calculated based on indicators for different aspects of financial openness published in the IMF’s 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER).  The index is 
the first standardized principal component of these four variables:  
a. Variable indicating the presence of multiple exchange rate 
b. Variable indicating restrictions on current account transactions 
c. 5-year average of variable indicating restrictions on capital account transactions 
d. Variable indicating the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds 
The index has a mean of zero, and the higher value of the index indicates the higher degree of 
financial openness. 
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IV. Results 
A reduced form regression to test the effect of the credit market quality on the riskiness 
of exports is as follow: 
Riskcontentc,t = α + CRIc,t + X’c,t + c + t + c,t 
where Riskcontentc,t is the risk content of exports index, CRIc,t is the creditor rights index, and 
X’c,t are the control variables mentioned above.  According to the predictions from the model, the 
lower quality of a country’s credit market would lead to the higher riskiness in exports, so the 
coefficient in front of CRIc,t should be negative.  The country-specific effects and time-specific 
effects are denoted by c and t, respectively.  The sample period is from 1978 to 2004. 
Table 2.7 reveals the results of the above fixed effects regression.  The first column 
includes the GDP per capita, the re-scaled square of GDP per capita, and the de jure financial 
openness measure as controls. The second column also includes, in addition to the three controls, 
the share of inward FDI.  The third column includes the trade openness measure instead of the 
share of inward FDI, and the fourth column includes all the control variables.  All of these four 
columns point out a significant negative relationship between the creditor rights index and the 
risk content of exports, suggesting that countries with lower degree of creditor rights have riskier 
exports. 
Another noteworthy point is that the trade openness measure does not appear to be 
significant in determining a country’s riskiness in exports.  This is consistent with the finding of 
Di Giovanni and Levchenko.  However, in contrast to Di Giovanni and Levchenko, the de jure 
financial openness measure has a significant positive effect on a country’s risk content in 
exports, meaning that higher financial openness is associated with higher exports in risky sectors. 
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A robustness test is conducted to examine if the regression results are driven by the high 
volatility of petroleum-related industries.  Table 2.8 revisited the previous regressions.  However, 
the dependent variable is different.  This time, miscellaneous petroleum and coal products 
industry and petroleum refineries industry are removed from the calculation of the risk content of 
exports.  The results of this test are in line with the main regressions. 
In addition, Table 2.9 investigated which components of the creditor rights index are 
responsible for varying the riskiness of exports.  The regressions use the same set of control 
variables as the main regressions, but the CRI is replaced by all of its components
7
.  It is shown 
that the restrictions on reorganization filing matters a great deal.  However, the lack of automatic 
stay on assets, the priority of secured creditors, and the removal of management after bankruptcy 
are not particularly important.  This evidence suggests that debtors’ ability to escape creditors’ 
demands supports riskier exports. In other words, if debtors can seek protection from creditors by 
filing for reorganization without restrictions, such as the need for creditor consent, creditors may, 
at best, be repaid with a delay. Thus, it is easier for debtors to get away without repaying their 
loans.  This could encourage more risk-shifting behavior and gear their investments towards the 
risky sectors, thereby increasing the production and exports in the risky sectors. 
 
V. Conclusion 
In sum, this paper series provides a possible cause behind the overshooting in asset price 
and traces some implications of a disruption in the financial sector to the real sector.  A two-
period, two-sectors, small open economy model predicts that the lack of monitoring of 
                                                 
7 The sample period for this analysis is from 1978 to 2003, because there is a considerable amount of missing data on the CRI 
components in 2004. 
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borrowing usage would lead to risk-shifting behavior in the financial market and thus over-
investment in a risky sector that is more subject to production volatility.  This simultaneously 
causes the risky sector’s stock price as well as its production and exports to be higher compared 
to the scenario when borrowing usage is well-monitored.  The result of an empirical exercise is 
also in line with a model’s hypothesis that countries with poorer quality credit markets are the 
ones with higher exports in sectors with greater volatility in production.   
As Caballero and Cowan (2007) pinpointed, countries that specialize in risky production 
sectors after trade liberalization are more likely to face higher macroeconomic volatility.  
Therefore, the results of this paper could hint a linkage between financial sector policy stance 
and macroeconomic conditions, suggesting that countries with weak monitoring system in 
financial sector may experience more volatile output.  Nevertheless, such linkage needed to be 
more closely investigated in further studies. 
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VI. APPENDIX A. 
Table 2.1: Variables and Data Sources 
Variable Data Source 
Value added by sectors 
UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database, 
UN National Accounts Official 
Country Data 
Exports by sector  UN Comtrade Database 
Creditor rights index Djankov et al. (2007) 
Share of inward FDI Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) 
GDP per capita in constant dollar IFS 
Trade openness IFS 
Chinn-Ito financial openness index Chinn and Ito (2008) 
 
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Risk content of exports index 1423 0.1837 0.7893 0.00002 12.95 
Creditor rights index 1415 1.9025 1.1581 0 4 
Share of inward FDI 1143 0.0236 0.0410 0 0.284 
GDP per capita in constant dollar 1148 10207.46 9654.44 191.10 39004.86 
Trade openness 1117 4.0334 0.5218 2.446 5.930 
Chinn-Ito financial openness 
index 1122 0.5064 1.5806 -1.831 2.500 
 
Table 2.3: Pair-Wise Correlations 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Risk content of exports index 1      
2. Creditor rights index 0.0301 1     
3. Share of inward FDI -0.0941 0.097 1    
4. GDP per capita in constant 
dollar 
-0.1113 0.2849 0.3639 1   
5. Trade openness 0.0479 0.1724 -0.0552 0.1159 1  
6. Chinn-Ito financial openness 
index 
-0.0482 0.3124 0.3226 0.6357 0.1672 1 
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Table 2.4: Sector Summary Statistics 
Sector Name 
Growth of Value Added 
Mean Std. Dev. 
Agriculture 0.0023 0.1455 
Beverages 0.0395 0.5111 
Fabricated metal products 0.0416 0.4450 
Food products 0.0440 0.4069 
Footwear, except rubber or plastic -0.0129 0.8806 
Furniture, except metal 0.3375 5.4811 
Glass and products 0.0647 0.4608 
Industrial chemicals 0.1565 0.9894 
Iron and steel 0.2105 1.1886 
Leather products -0.0106 0.6530 
Machinery, electric 0.0151 2.6286 
Machinery, except electrical 0.0431 0.8157 
Mining and quarrying -0.0022 0.1217 
Misc. petroleum and coal products 38.6708 499.9505 
Non-ferrous metals 0.3031 3.6214 
Other non-metallic mineral products 0.0464 0.4376 
Other chemicals -0.0014 0.3313 
Other manufactured products 1.5578 28.6340 
Paper and products 0.0562 0.3707 
Petroleum refineries -0.0068 1.4631 
Plastic products 0.0628 0.2887 
Pottery, china, earthenware 0.1240 2.5297 
Professional and scientific equipment 0.4467 4.0947 
Printing and publishing 0.0456 0.3301 
Rubber products 0.0656 0.5740 
Textiles -0.0169 0.2509 
Tobacco 0.1087 2.2677 
Transport equipment 0.0760 0.6354 
Wearing apparel, except footwear 0.1526 2.9813 
Wood products, except furniture 0.0629 0.3687 
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Table 2.5: Creditor Rights Reforms 
Country 
Year of 
Reform 
Change in 
CRI 
Reorganization 
Restrictions 
No 
Automatic 
Stay 
Priority to 
Secured 
Creditors 
Management 
do not Stay 
Austria 1982 -1 
   
-1 
Denmark 1984 1 
   
1 
United Kingdom 1985 1 
   
1 
Ireland 1990 -1 -1 
   
Canada 1992 -1 
   
-1 
Finland 1993 -2 -1 
  
-1 
India 1993 -1 
 
-1 
  
Russian Federation 1994 1 
   
1 
Romania 1994 1 
 
1 
  
Israel 1995 -1 -1 
   
Sweden 1995 -1 
   
-1 
Lithuania 1995 1 1 
   
Armenia 1996 -1 
 
-1 
  
Azerbaijan 1997 1 
   
1 
Kazakhstan 1997 1 
   
1 
Mongolia 1997 1 
   
1 
Niger 1998 -2 -1 
 
-1 
 
Indonesia 1998 -1 
 
-1 
  
Russian Federation 1998 -1 
   
-1 
Kazakhstan 1998 1 1 
   
Lithuania 1998 1 
  
1 
 
Thailand 1999 -1 
 
-1 
  
Ukraine 1999 -1 
 
-1 
  
Japan 2000 -1 
 
-1 
  
Malawi 2000 -1 -1 
   
Bulgaria 2000 1 1 
   
Kazakhstan 2001 -1 
  
-1 
 
Uruguay 2001 1 
 
1 
  
Japan 2003 1 
 
1 
  
Russian Federation 2002 1 
   
1 
Romania 2003 1 
 
1 
  
Spain 2004 1 
  
1 
 
Source: Djankov et al (2007) 
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Table 2.6: Creditor Rights Index and Its Components in 2003 
country CRI 
CRI Components 
Reorganization 
Restrictions 
No 
Automatic 
Stay 
Priority to Secured 
Creditors 
Management 
do not Stay 
Benin 0 0 0 0 0 
Burkina Faso 0 0 0 0 0 
Cameroon 0 0 0 0 0 
Central African 
Republic 
0 0 0 0 0 
Chad 0 0 0 0 0 
Colombia 0 0 0 0 0 
Congo, Rep. 0 0 0 0 0 
Cote d'Ivoire 0 0 0 0 0 
Ecuador 0 0 0 0 0 
France 0 0 0 0 0 
Guinea 0 0 0 0 0 
Lao PDR 0 0 0 0 0 
Mali 0 0 0 0 0 
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 
Niger 0 0 0 0 0 
Oman 0 0 0 0 0 
Peru 0 0 0 0 0 
Senegal 0 0 0 0 0 
Togo 0 0 0 0 0 
Tunisia 0 0 0 0 0 
Yemen, Rep. 0 0 0 0 0 
Algeria 1 0 0 0 1 
Argentina 1 0 0 1 0 
Brazil 1 0 1 0 0 
Burundi 1 0 0 0 1 
Canada 1 0 0 1 0 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 
1 0 0 0 1 
Costa Rica 1 0 0 1 0 
Finland 1 0 0 1 0 
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Table 2.6: Creditor Rights Index and Its Components in 2003 (Continued) 
country CRI 
CRI Components 
Reorganization 
Restrictions 
No 
Automatic 
Stay 
Priority to Secured 
Creditors 
Management 
do not Stay 
Ghana 1 0 0 0 1 
Greece 1 1 0 0 0 
Guatemala 1 0 0 1 0 
Hungary 1 1 0 0 0 
Ireland 1 0 0 1 0 
Jordan 1 0 0 0 1 
Lesotho 1 0 0 1 0 
Mauritania 1 0 1 0 0 
Morocco 1 0 0 0 1 
Pakistan 1 0 0 1 0 
Papua New 
Guinea 
1 0 0 1 0 
Paraguay 1 0 0 1 0 
Philippines 1 0 0 1 0 
Poland 1 0 0 0 1 
Portugal 1 0 0 1 0 
Puerto Rico 1 0 0 1 0 
Rwanda 1 1 0 0 0 
Sweden 1 0 0 1 0 
Switzerland 1 0 0 1 0 
United States 1 0 0 1 0 
Vietnam 1 0 0 1 0 
Zambia 1 0 0 0 1 
Armenia 2 0 0 1 1 
Bangladesh 2 0 0 1 1 
Belarus 2 1 0 0 1 
Belgium 2 0 0 1 1 
Bolivia 2 1 0 1 0 
Bulgaria 2 0 0 1 1 
Cambodia 2 1 0 1 0 
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Table 2.6: Creditor Rights Index and Its Components in 2003 (Continued) 
country CRI 
CRI Components 
Reorganization 
Restrictions 
No 
Automatic 
Stay 
Priority to Secured 
Creditors 
Management 
do not Stay 
Chile 2 0 1 1 0 
China 2 1 0 1 0 
Dominican 
Republic 
2 0 1 1 0 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2 1 0 0 1 
Georgia 2 0 0 1 1 
Haiti 2 0 1 1 0 
Honduras 2 1 0 0 1 
India 2 1 0 1 0 
Indonesia 2 0 0 1 1 
Iran 2 0 0 1 1 
Italy 2 1 0 0 1 
Jamaica 2 0 1 1 0 
Japan 2 0 0 1 1 
Kazakhstan 2 1 0 0 1 
Lithuania 2 1 0 1 0 
Madagascar 2 0 0 1 1 
Malawi 2 0 1 0 1 
Moldova 2 0 1 1 0 
Mongolia 2 0 0 1 1 
Mozambique 2 0 1 1 0 
Namibia 2 0 0 1 1 
Nepal 2 1 1 0 0 
Norway 2 1 0 1 0 
Romania 2 0 1 1 0 
Russian 
Federation 
2 1 0 0 1 
Slovak Republic 2 0 1 1 0 
Spain 2 0 1 0 1 
Sri Lanka 2 1 0 0 1 
Taiwan, China 2 0 0 1 1 
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Table 2.6: Creditor Rights Index and Its Components in 2003 (Continued) 
country CRI 
CRI Components 
Reorganization 
Restrictions 
No 
Automatic 
Stay 
Priority to Secured 
Creditors 
Management 
do not Stay 
Tanzania 2 0 1 0 1 
Thailand 2 0 0 1 1 
Turkey 2 1 1 0 0 
Uganda 2 0 1 0 1 
Ukraine 2 0 0 1 1 
United Arab 
Emirates 
2 1 1 0 0 
Uzbekistan 2 1 0 1 0 
Albania 3 0 1 1 1 
Angola 3 1 1 1 0 
Australia 3 0 1 1 1 
Austria 3 0 1 1 0 
Azerbaijan 3 0 1 1 1 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
3 0 1 1 1 
Botswana 3 0 1 1 1 
Croatia 3 0 1 1 1 
Czech Republic 3 0 1 1 1 
Denmark 3 0 1 1 1 
Uzbekistan 2 1 0 1 0 
Albania 3 0 1 1 1 
Angola 3 1 1 1 0 
Australia 3 0 1 1 1 
Austria 3 0 1 1 0 
Azerbaijan 3 0 1 1 1 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
3 0 1 1 1 
Botswana 3 0 1 1 1 
Croatia 3 0 1 1 1 
Czech Republic 3 0 1 1 1 
Denmark 3 0 1 1 1 
El Salvador 3 1 1 1 0 
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Table 2.6: Creditor Rights Index and Its Components in 2003 (Continued) 
country CRI 
CRI Components 
Reorganization 
Restrictions 
No 
Automatic 
Stay 
Priority to Secured 
Creditors 
Management 
do not Stay 
Ethiopia 3 1 0 1 1 
Germany 3 0 1 1 1 
Israel 3 0 1 1 1 
Korea, Rep. 3 0 1 1 1 
Kuwait 3 1 1 1 0 
Kyrgyz Republic 3 0 1 1 1 
Latvia 3 1 0 1 1 
Macedonia 3 0 1 1 1 
Malaysia 3 1 1 1 0 
Netherlands 3 0 1 1 1 
Saudi Arabia 3 1 1 1 0 
Singapore 3 0 1 1 1 
Slovenia 3 0 1 1 1 
South Africa 3 1 0 1 1 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
3 1 1 0 1 
Uruguay 3 1 1 1 0 
Venezuela, RB 3 0 1 1 1 
Hong Kong 4 1 1 1 1 
Kenya 4 1 1 1 1 
Lebanon 4 1 1 1 1 
New Zealand 4 1 1 1 1 
Nicaragua 4 1 1 1 1 
Nigeria 4 1 1 1 1 
Panama 4 1 1 1 1 
United Kingdom 4 1 1 1 1 
Zimbabwe 4 1 1 1 1 
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Table 2.7: Regressions of Creditors’ Protection on the Riskiness of Exports 
Dependent Variable: Risk Content of Exports Index 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Creditor rights index -0.12* -0.12* -0.13** -0.13** 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Constant dollar GDP per capita  -0.31 -0.31 -0.46 -0.47 
 
(0.30) (0.30) (0.33) (0.33) 
(GDP per capita)
2
/100 3.63 3.60 6.27 6.30 
 
(5.85) (5.86) (6.36) (6.37) 
Financial openness index 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Share of inward FDI 
 
-0.31 
 
-0.50 
  
(1.12) 
 
(1.16) 
Trade openness 
  
0.002 -0.003 
   
(0.15) (0.15) 
No. of Observations 1120 1119 1090 1089 
No. of Countries 61 61 60 60 
R-squared 0.0102 0.0109 0.0124 0.0132 
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Table 2.8: Regressions of Creditors’ Protection on the Riskiness of Exports-Excluding 
Petroleum-Related Industries 
Dependent Variable: Risk Content of Exports Index (without petroleum-related industries) 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Creditor rights index -0.07* -0.07* -0.08* -0.08* 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant dollar GDP per capita -0.14 -0.15 -0.22 -0.23 
 
(0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.21) 
(GDP per capita)
2
/100 0.96 0.94 1.63 1.66 
 
(3.77) (3.78) (4.10) (4.11) 
Financial openness index 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Share of inward FDI 
 
-0.30 
 
-0.45 
  
(0.72) 
 
(0.75) 
Trade openness 
  
-0.14 -0.14 
   
(0.10) (0.10) 
No. of Observations 1120 1119 1090 1089 
No. of Countries 61 61 60 60 
R-squared 0.0009 0.0014 0.0002 0.0004 
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Table 2.9: Regressions of Creditors’ Protection Components on the Riskiness of Exports 
Dependent Variable: Risk Content of Exports Index  
Explanatory Variables 1 2 3 4 
Creditor rights index components 
   
Reorganization Restrictions -0.20* -0.23* -0.25* -0.26* 
 
(0.11) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
No Automatic Stay -0.17 -0.17 -0.18 -0.18 
 
(0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) 
Priority to Secured Creditors 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 
 
(0.33) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) 
Management do not Stay 0.01 -0.002 -0.02 -0.01 
 
(0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Constant dollar GDP per capita  -0.30 -0.41 -0.56* -0.58* 
 
(0.24) (0.28) (0.32) (0.32) 
(GDP per capita)
2
/100 4.00 6.47 8.42 8.62 
 
(4.59) (5.53) (6.00) (6.01) 
Financial openness index 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Share of inward FDI 
 
-0.61 
 
-0.81 
  
(1.00) 
 
(1.02) 
Trade openness 
  
-0.09 -0.09 
   
(0.14) (0.14) 
No. of Observations 1053 1053 1029 1028 
No. of Countries 60 60 59 59 
R-squared 0.0047 0.0065 0.007 0.0082 
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CHAPTER 3 
Equity Prices and Equity Flows: Testing Theory of the Information-Efficiency Tradeoff 
 
I. Introduction 
Recently, international capital markets globalization has ushered large flows of 
international equity, which has substantially affected the cost of capital, the capital market 
volatility, and economic growth
8
.  These flows take two major forms: Foreign Direct 
Investments (FDI) and Foreign Equity Investments (FPI).  FDI involve a control over a firm’s 
management, whereas FPI do not involve such control.  These two types of flows have different 
implications on the stability of the capital markets of the host countries and of other countries.  
While FDI is more stable, FPI is usually liquidated during financial crises (Frankel and Rose 
(1996), Lipsey (2001), and Sarno and Taylor (1999)).  Hence, it is necessary to take into account 
the composition of international equity flows in order to examine the cost and benefits of the 
liberalization of international equity markets. 
Although the importance of the distinction between FDI and FPI is well known, the 
determinants of the choice between them have not been widely explored.  In the past, 
multinationals engaged in FDI, collective investment funds engaged in FPI.  Thus, investors’ 
choice between multinationals and investment funds would influence the composition of FDI and 
FPI.  But investment funds have recently become more active in FDI investment than ever.  As 
indicated in the 2006 World Investment Report, about half of the $261 billion raised by these 
funds were used towards FDI. This means that the choice between FDI and FPI has become 
                                                 
8 See, for instance, Bekaert and Harvey (2000), Errunza and Miller (2000), Henry (2000), Chari and Henry (2004), and Bekaert, 
Harvey, and Lundblad (2005). Stulz (2005) provided a review about the development of financial liberalization and its 
limitations. 
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more direct.  These funds have undergone significant expansion due to the low interest rate, high 
investors’ liquidity, and the satisfactory performance of private equity funds.  Nevertheless, 
global financial crises and the credit crunch that followed have made it more difficult for private 
equity funds to conduct FDI investments. 
Previous literature (Froot and Stein (1991), Klein, Peek, and Rosengren (2002), Rossi and 
Volpin (2004), Aguiar and Gopinath (2005), Albuquerque, Loayza, and Serven (2005), and 
Baker, Foley, and Wurgler (2009)) studied the determinants of FDI (including cross-border 
M&As) and emphasized factors such as wealth, credit constraints, governance, mispricing, and 
fire sales.  Other papers examined the determinants of FPI (such as Griffin, Nardari, and Stulz 
(2004), Gelos and Wei (2005), Ferreira and Matos (2008), and Leuz, Lins, and Warnock (2009)). 
However, none of them investigated the impact of the liquidity risk or studied the determinants 
of the source countries’ FDI and FPI composition. 
Following the study of Goldstein, Razin, and Tong (2007), this chapter tests three 
hypotheses concerning the composition of foreign equity investment in the presence of liquidity 
risk. First, the FDI-to-FPI price differential is negatively related to liquidity risk (the "Price 
Discount Hypothesis"). The idea is that direct investments would incur a price discount because 
market participants do not know whether the FDI investor liquidates a firm because of an 
idiosyncratic liquidity shock, or because, as an informed investor, the firm is hit by a 
productivity shock. Second, the FDI-to-FPI composition would skew towards FPI if investors 
expect to experience liquidity shortage in the future (the ""Equity-Composition Hypothesis"). 
Since direct investments are more costly to liquidate, due to the price discount, investors would 
be inclined to hold less FDI if they expect more severe liquidity shock. The third hypothesis, on 
the other hand, states that the FDI-to-FPI composition would skew towards FDI if the past FDI-
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to-FPI stocks were larger (the "Strategic Complementarity Hypothesis").   If the initial 
proportion of direct investments is higher, it is more likely that a direct investment is sold due to 
liquidity needs.  This improves the price of the prematurely sold direct investment, creating an 
incentive for more investors to choose FDI rather than FPI. 
In conducting an empirical test, the nationwide sales of external assets is used as a proxy 
for liquidity problems, and the measures of FDI and FPI are based on the source countries’ stock 
of external assets compiled by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).  Using a sample of 65 countries 
between 1970 and 2004, this chapter examined the effects of liquidity crisis on the relative price 
of FDI and FPI as well as the outward FPI to FDI ratio. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section II explains the adverse selection 
theory of a choice between FPI and FDI.  Section III states the main hypotheses that would be 
empirically tested. Section IV describes the data.  Section V describes the measures of liquidity 
risk.  Section VI presents the econometric model and its different specifications.  Sections VII 
and VIII reveal the results and some robustness tests.  Finally, Section IX concludes. 
 
II. Adverse-Selection Theory 
The theory of an investor’s choice between FPI and FDI is based on an information-
efficiency trade-off between the two.  On the one hand, direct investors observe the information 
about the true productivity of the investment and have control over the management, while 
portfolio investors could not do so.  As a result, an FDI would yield a higher expected payoff 
compared to an FPI if the investment is held until maturity.  On the other hand, the asymmetry of 
information about the investment productivity causes FDI to be relatively more difficult to sell 
before they mature.  In other words, when an FDI is sold, the market does not know whether it is 
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sold because of an investor’s need of liquidity or because of the low productivity of the 
investment.  Hence, the price of a direct investment would suffer an informational discount, and 
the magnitude of the discount relies on the market’s perception about the probability of a 
liquidity shock.  Such problem would not arise in the case of an FPI. 
Theoretical prediction states that the composition of foreign equity investment would be 
tilted towards FPI and away from FDI if investors expect to face aggregate liquidity shock.  This 
is because the liquidity problem would cause them to sell their assets, and it is more costly to 
liquidate direct investments.  This prediction is independent of the source of illiquidity. 
The illiquidity situation was derived endogenously, as a result of asymmetric information, in 
Goldstein and Razin (2006) and Kirabaeva (2009).  The important element of this method is that 
foreign direct investors can obtain inside information about the investment fundamentals because 
of their ownership of the firms, which gives FDI an advantage over FPI in terms of managing the 
investment.  But when investors need to sell their investment due to liquidity shock, FDI would 
face a “lemons” problem and must be sold at a discount.  Furthermore, investors’ idiosyncratic 
liquidity shocks are triggered by aggregate liquidity shock.  When that happens, investors would 
then be forced to prematurely sell their investments.  However, there are still some investors who 
are less exposed to the liquidity shock.  As a result, once liquidity shock strikes, some investors 
must sell their direct investments at a discounted price because the buyers do not know if they 
sell because they truly need liquidity or because of the adverse information. 
An equilibrium characterization is that the current FDI-FPI composition is dependent on 
the past composition.  In a pooled equilibrium, direct investors are heterogeneous in terms of 
their idiosyncratic future liquidity needs.  In this case, investors with low liquidity needs would 
create negative externalities on those with high liquidity needs.  The market would estimate the 
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liquidity risk as an average between the high and the low probabilities of the liquidity shocks.  If 
an investor with high liquidity need sells his investment prematurely, the market would perceive 
that such sale has to with joint occurrences of some idiosyncratic low productivity liquidity 
realizations. Because of the information asymmetry, common knowledge about the distribution 
of idiosyncratic productivity and liquidity shocks could only help the market to evaluate the 
liquidated assets imperfectly. Thus, FDI are sold at a discount. 
If investors with high liquidity need could distinguish themselves from those with low-
liquidity needs, the former would be able to sell their assets at a better price.  However, this is 
not possible in the pooling equilibrium.  This means that the high liquidity need investors would 
generate a positive information-externality over low liquidity need investors among direct 
investors.  If the proportion of investors with high liquidity need increases, it is more likely that 
the prematurely sold FDI in the market would come from those who really need liquidity.  This 
would mitigate the price discount and encourage investors to choose to become direct investors 
rather than FPI investors.  Pooling equilibrium is thus characterized by strategic 
complementarity.  A dynamic implication is that the larger share of FDI flows in the past and in 
the present would lead to the larger share of FDI flows in the future. 
 
III. Testable Hypotheses 
The predictions from the theory described in the previous section lead to the three 
hypotheses, which will be empirically tested. 
a. "Price Discount Hypothesis" – the ratio of FDI price to FPI price is negatively affected by 
liquidity risk. The idea is that direct investments would incur a price discount because 
market participants do not know whether the FDI investor liquidates a firm because of an 
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idiosyncratic liquidity shock, or because, as an informed investor, the firm is hit by a 
productivity shock. 
b. "Equity-Composition Hypothesis” – the FDI-to-FPI composition would skew towards FPI 
if investors expect to experience liquidity shortage in the future. Since direct investments 
are more costly to liquidate, due to the price discount, investors would be inclined to hold 
less FDI if they expect more severe liquidity shock. 
c. "Strategic Complementarity Hypothesis" – the FDI-to-FPI composition would skew 
towards FDI if the past FDI-to-FPI stocks were larger.   If the initial proportion of direct 
investments is higher, it is more likely that a direct investment is sold due to liquidity 
needs.  This improves the price of the prematurely sold direct investment, creating an 
incentive for more investors to choose FDI rather than FPI. 
 
IV. Data 
A key variable of interest is the ratio between the assets that a country holds as FPI and 
the assets that it holds as FDI.  To measure this ratio, we use the recently available data on a 
country's external assets and liabilities, as compiled by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).  They 
assembled a comprehensive dataset on the external assets and liabilities of 140 developed and 
developing countries for the period 1970-2004.   They distinguished four types of international 
assets: foreign direct investment, foreign portfolio (equity) investment, official reserves, and 
external debt. The convention for distinguishing between direct investment and portfolio 
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investment is to see whether the ownership of shares of companies is above or below 10%. If it is 
above the threshold, then it is classified as direct investment
9
.  
For most countries, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) used as a benchmark the official 
International Investment Position (IIP) estimates. However, only very few countries have 
consistently reported their IIP over the period 1970-2004, and the majority of countries started to 
report in the early 1990s. For earlier years, they then work backwards with data on capital flows, 
together with calculations for capital gains and losses, to generate estimates for stock positions. 
In their estimation, due to cross-country variation in the reliability of the data, they also employ a 
range of valuation techniques to obtain the most appropriate series for each country. Particularly, 
they use similar valuation adjustment for FPI and FDI. 
The dataset consists of 140 economies from 1970 to 2004, and the stock of international 
assets and liabilities are divided into four types: foreign direct investment, portfolio equity 
investment, official reserves, and external debt. The dataset contains more data on developed 
economies than developing ones due to data availability.  The outward FDI and FPI from the 
source countries are measured using the data of the source countries' stock of FDI assets and 
equity assets, respectively.  The other macroeconomic variables, which will serve as controls in 
the regressions, are from WDI. 
Our sample includes both developed and developing countries as source countries for 
outward FPI and FDI. New sources of FDI are emerging among developing and transition 
economies, as multinationals from these economies become major regional - or sometimes even 
                                                 
9 Arguably, there is the problem of "borderline" cases where it is difficult to classify an investment as FDI or FPI. In countries 
where FPI is liberalized, a portfolio investor might buy more than 10 percent of the shares of companies without having a "lasting 
interest" to control the companies. And yet that investor's investment can be classified as FDI. Using the control interest as a 
dividing line, there are circumstances where FDI can turn into FPI through the dilution of ownership and loss of control. 
Conversely, FPI can be transformed into FDI, if the investor decides to have a management interest in the companies whose 
assets he had earlier purchased as FPI. 
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global - players. It seems that the new global links these multinationals are forging will have far-
reaching repercussions in shaping the world economic landscape of the coming decades 
(UNCTAD: World Investment Report 2006). Table 1 lists the countries covered in the sample 
from 1985 till 2004, and their mean ratio of FPI to FDI. Table 2 provides summary statistics
10
. 
A key explanatory variable measures the extent of liquidity problems in the source 
country. As we explain in the next section, we estimate this variable using data on annual flows 
in external assets. This data is collected from the IMF's Balance of Payments dataset
11
.  Finally, 
in the following empirical sections, we will also use a few macroeconomic variables as our 
explanatory variables. These macroeconomic data, such as GDP, current account balance, 
exchange rates, and trade openness, are collected from the IMF's World Economic Outlook 
database, which has historical cross-country coverage. Some other variables, such as political 
risk and opacity, are collected from various datasets and will be described in more details when 
introduced. 
 
V. Measures of Liquidity Crises 
We follow Goldstein, Razin, and Tong (2007) and define a liquidity crisis as an incident 
of the negative purchase of external assets, which is composed of foreign exchange reserves, 
direct investments, portfolio investments, and other assets. The rationale is that when a country is 
in need of liquidity, it would sell off its less liquid assets to get cash or more liquid holdings. 
Two measures will be used to proxy the liquidity crisis. The first measure is the truncated 
liquidity crisis severity variable, which is equal to the country's sales of external assets over its 
                                                 
10 Sample coverage in the following econometric analyses varies a bit, depending on whether countries have data on various 
explanatory variables.  Table 1 is for the sample when countries have data available for the estimations in Table 3. 
11 This data does not account for changes in valuation, and therefore allows us to capture the notion of the quantity of investment 
liquidations in our model. 
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total assets in the next period if such sales is positive (if the liquidity crisis in the next period is 
present) and zero otherwise. This measure will also capture the magnitude of the liquidity crisis. 
The second measure is the liquidity crisis binary variable, which is equal to one if the purchase 
of the external assets in the next period becomes negative and zero otherwise. 
 
VI. Estimating the Effect of the Severity of Liquidity Shocks 
The crux of our theory is that if a country expects greater liquidity problems in the future 
it will increase the share of FPI relative to FDI. We use the variable EtSeverityi,t+1 to proxy for 
the severity of expected liquidity shocks, as perceived in period t, and investigate how it affects 
the FPI/FDI ratio for source countries.   The severity variable is defined as the negative purchase 
of external assets divided by the total assets.  The variable is set to zero if such purchase take 
positive values. 
The empirical analysis has two stages. First, to estimate the expected severity of liquidity 
shocks, we run the following regression: 
                                               (1) 
Then, we use the expected value of Severityi,t+1 estimated from (1) as our main explanatory 
variable for the ratio of FPI to FDI as well as their levels in period t. 
The vector Zit is motivated by the literature on financial crises (e.g., Frankel and Rose, 
1996). It includes source country political risk index, current account surplus over GDP, and a 
country's external debt over total assets. Political risk index, from the International Country Risk 
Guide, is based mainly on government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, 
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internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, and bureaucracy quality
12
.  It has been linked to 
financial crises in earlier literature, with higher political risk making the economy vulnerable to 
capital flow reversals (e.g. Gelos and Wei (2005), and Broner, Gelos and Reinhart (2006)). 
Identifying the system in (1) and the structural equations requires the exclusion restriction to be 
satisfied. That is, the variables in Zit should have no effect on the price ratio and the value ratio of 
FDI and FPI except for the indirect effect via the expected liquidity shock. Indeed, our theory 
does not suggest the inclusion of political risk, current account surplus, and external debt as 
direct controls in our structural equations, and we are not aware of other models that suggest 
such a link. In earlier literature, the host country's political risk has been tied to its level of FDI 
due to confiscation considerations (Albuquerque (2003) and Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and 
Volosovych (2008)). The link between FDI and these confiscation considerations, however, does 
not apply to the source country. Another potential concern is that the current account balance 
may indirectly affect the FPI/FDI composition through affecting the exchange rate, which may 
then generate some wealth effect and influence FDI and FPI asymmetrically as in Froot and 
Stein (1991)
13
.  To alleviate this concern, we include a control variable for the real exchange rate 
in our structural equations
14
. 
 
                                                 
12 See http://www.prsgroup.com/commonhtml/ methods.html\# \_International\_Country\_Risk.} 
13 The Froot and Stein (1991) model operates via a wealth effect in the host country. Because of frictions in control that exist in 
FDI but not in FPI, wealth is important only for FDI. Thus a rise in host-country wealth, from the appreciation of its real 
exchange rate, will increase its FDI inflow, while having no impact on its FPI receipts. One could potentially extend their model 
to source countries with the prediction that real exchange rate appreciation may increase FDI outflow, relative to FPI outflow. 
14 Baker, Foley, and Wurgler (2009) also argue that higher source country's wealth could significantly boost FDI outflow, due to 
cheap financial capital. They use the market to book ratio in the US stock market as a proxy of cheap capital for US firms. As the 
data on exchange rate has more country coverage than the market/book ratio, we will then use the real exchange rate also to 
proxy for the wealth of source country. 
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1. Estimating the Effect of a Liquidity Threshold 
We also employ an alternative model - the threshold model. The idea here is that a 
liquidity shock has a strong impact on the FPI/FDI composition only after it reaches a certain 
threshold, and becomes a “liquidity crisis”.  In this model, we start by estimating the liquidity 
crisis dummy:  
 
                            
                    
                    
                             (2) 
 
where Severityi,t+1 is a function of independent variables as specified in equation (1).  
After estimating the liquidity crisis dummy, we use it as an explanatory variable in the second-
stage equations. 
 
2. Estimating the Effects of Liquidity Risk on the FDI to FPI Price Discount 
We estimate a composite price for FDI investment by using prices of different 
components of FDI, the market component and the reinvested earnings component, weighted by 
their shares to the total FDI flows.  
             
                
        
                (3) 
where  is the share of the market component of FDI over the total FDI inflows, and        
represents the share of the reinvested earnings component of FDI.  The market component serves 
as a proxy for M&A FDI, whereas the reinvested earnings component serves as a proxy for 
greenfield FDI.  The data of both the FDI equity inflows and the total FDI inflows are from the 
UNCTAD WID Country Profile.  The stock market index serves as a proxy for price of the 
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market component of FDI,      
      . The data of the stock market index of various countries are 
obtained from the Economist Intelligence Unit database. 
The price of the earnings component of FDI,     
        
, will be estimated using the following 
formula of the unit price of investment, which is specified in del Rio (2004). 
    
                                                                (4) 
The variable pi is the PPP price level of investment. The variable cgdp is the GDP per capita at 
world price, and ci is the investment share of cgdp. Similarly, the variable rgdpl is the GDP per 
capita at constant world price using Laspeyres price index, and ki is the investment share of 
rgdpl. The term [(ci*cgdp)/(ki*rgdpl)] serves as the implicit deflator of investment (the data of 
calculating     
        
 is from Penn World Table  database of the University of Pennsylvania). 
In the same way as the price of the equity component of FDI, the price of FPI is also estimated 
by the stock market index. 
To test the price discount hypothesis, the reduced form regression for the prices of FPI 
and FDI is the following: 
             
                                                       (5) 
The term Wi,t includes the log of GDP, the log of GDP per capita (constant price), and inflation. 
The liquidity crisis variable refers to both the severity and the binary measures of liquidity crisis, 
which will be instrumented on the factors that affect the possibility that the country may 
experience a liquidity crisis. The excluded instrumental variables include the current account 
balance to GDP, the government budget balance to GDP, the percentage of short-term debt, and 
the measures of political and financial risks from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The 
current account balance and the government budget balance indicate the country's need of 
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external financing, whereas the percentage of short-term debt signals the country's need of 
liquidity. The political and financial risks are associated with the creditworthiness of a country 
(Haque et al. (1997)).  According to the price discount hypothesis, the coefficient    should be 
negative due to the informational discount on the price of FDI. 
In addition to the price discount hypothesis, the strategic complementarity hypothesis 
also predicts that if a country initially has a higher proportion of direct investors, the 
informational discount on the price of FDI will be lowered and the price of FDI and therefore 
increase. To test both of these hypotheses, the above equation will be modified as 
                 
                                    
        
                                                     (6) 
       
                               
The term                               is used as a proxy of the proportion of direct 
investors (all inward capital includes inward FDI, FPI, debt, and derivatives). Similar to the 
previous regression,    should be negative according to the price discount hypothesis.  In 
addition, the coefficient    should be positive due to the mitigation of the informational discount 
on the price of FDI as predicted by the strategic complementarity hypothesis. 
 
3. Estimating the Effects of Liquidity Risk on the Composition of Outward FPI to FDI 
Reduced form econometric models will be employed to explore whether the hypothesized 
mechanisms of international capital movements hold in the data. First, this paper will explore the 
relationship between liquidity crisis and the capital flows out of the source countries. Unlike 
Goldstein, Razin, and Tong (2007), which regressed the ratio of FPI to FDI outflows on the 
predicted probability of the liquidity crisis, this paper will regress the FPI to FDI outflows on the 
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instrumented liquidity crisis measures. The effect of the liquidity crisis on the ratio of FPI to FDI 
outflows will be investigated using the following set-up: 
               
                                                            (7) 
where the liquidity crisis variable will be instrumented as previously described. 
The term LiquidityCrisisi,t+1 is measured as the negative net annual purchase of external 
assets - which include FDI, FPI, other investments and foreign reserves - in country i in period 
t+1. We normalize these flows by the stock of total external assets of country i at time t.  Xit are 
variables that affect both the liquidity shock and the ratio of FPI to FDI.  The term        
denotes time fixed effects,    stands for country fixed effects, and      is the i.i.d. residual. In (7), 
we take the log of the FPI/FDI to reduce the impact of extreme values.  
Our selection of control variables Xit is motivated by Faria et al. (2007), who examined 
the determinants of the composition of a country's external liabilities.  They considered a set of 
explanatory variables, including country size, economic development level, trade openness and 
financial reform. They find that only country size has some explanatory power on the 
distribution of equity liabilities between direct investment and portfolio equity.  As little work 
has empirically examined the composition of external assets, we use the control variables in 
Faria et al. (2007) as our starting point. First, we include two variables - the log of the population 
and the log of GDP per capita in constant US dollars – to capture market size and the level of 
economic development. We then also include trade openness, as measured by imports plus 
exports over GDP, to control for the connection between trade and FDI. We further include the 
lagged real exchange rate to capture the wealth effect on capital flows (see Froot and Stein 
(1991)).  Table 3.2 provides summary statistics of these variables. 
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We also consider another specification for the FPI/FDI equation, where the lagged 
FPI/FDI can affect the current FPI/FDI. Hence, we estimate:  
                                          
                                   
                                                                         
                                            (8) 
There is a complication in estimating equation (8). That is, if      is not i.i.d but serially-
correlated, then                  
    will be correlated with      and thus create an endogeneity 
problem. To correct this problem, we then use the Arellano-Bond dynamic GMM approach to 
estimate equation (8). 
However, if the number of instruments is larger than the number of groups of data in the 
dynamic panel model with instrumental variables, it is possible that the problem of too many 
instruments may occur. If it does, the instruments, although each of them are valid, might be 
collectively invalid in the finite samples because they over fit the endogenous variable and will 
also weaken the reliability of the Hansen test for instrument validity (Roodman (2008)). 
Therefore, the number of instruments included in the dynamic panel models may be less than 
those included in the fixed effects models. 
Next, the effects of the liquidity risk as well as the initial proportion of outward direct 
investment on the compositions of outward FPI to FDI will be explored by the following fixed 
effects and dynamic panel regressions: 
                         
                                   
                                       
                                                    (9) 
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         (10) 
                                      
The coefficient before the liquidity crisis variable will capture the main effect of liquidity risk, 
since the immediate reaction of investors facing liquidity shock would be to shift towards more 
liquid asset. The sign of this coefficient is predicted to be positive. In addition to the main effect 
of the liquidity risk, the interaction term between the liquidity risk and the proportion of outward 
FDI to all outward capital is also included to capture the effect of the mitigated adverse selection 
problem. As predicted by the strategic complementary hypothesis, the higher proportion of direct 
investors will lower the informational discount on the price of FDI and hence increase the 
outward FDI. Thus, the coefficient of the interaction term is expected to be negative. The set of 
controls will be the same as in the previous regression. 
 
4. Estimating the Effects of Liquidity Risk on the Gross Flows of FDI and FPI 
Finally, the regressions previously run on the compositions of outward FPI to FDI will be 
run again on the values of FPI and FDI to observe whether the results are consistent with one 
another. 
 
VII. Results 
1. Effects of Liquidity Risk on Stock Prices 
The results of the regression of the ratio of FDI price to FPI price are presented in Table 
3.3. Column 1 reveals the results of regressing the FDI to FPI price ratio on the instrumented 
liquidity crisis severity measure, while column 2 shows the results of regressing the price ratio 
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on the instrumented liquidity crisis binary variable. The overall results are consistent with the 
price discount hypothesis regardless of the measures of liquidity crisis used in the regressions. 
The higher liquidity risk negatively affects the ratio of FDI price to FPI price. This mirrored the 
informational discount because market participants do not know whether an FDI is sold due to 
liquidity shock or due to adverse productivity realization. In addition, the results showed that the 
higher GDP per capita (constant price) is associated with the increase in the ratio of FDI price to 
FPI price. 
Nevertheless, when taking into account the initial portion of direct investors in the 
market, the regression results reveal that adverse selection problem is mitigated. Table 3.4 
illustrated the results of regressing the ratio of FDI price to FPI price on the instrumented 
liquidity crisis variables and the interaction term between liquidity crisis and the initial portion of 
FDI investors. The negative coefficients of the instrumented liquidity crisis measures remained 
in line with the price discount hypothesis. However, the positive coefficients of the interaction 
term indicate that with higher initial portion of FDI investors, the higher liquidity risk can 
actually raise the ratio of FDI price to FPI price. This is consistent with the strategic 
complementarity hypothesis, which infers that the higher initial portion of direct investors will 
increase the probability that FDIs are sold due to liquidity shock, lowering the informational 
discount on the price of FDI. 
 
2. Effect of Liquidity Risk on the Composition of Equity Flows 
Table 3.5 presents the regression results of the ratio between outward FPI and FDI. 
Columns 1 and 2 report the fixed effects estimations, while columns 3 and 4 present the 
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Arellano-Bond dynamic panel estimations. The results of all the regressions in this part point 
toward the same direction. 
The empirical results in this part appear to be in line with the predictions in Goldstein and 
Razin (2006) and the empirical results in Goldstein, Razin, and Tong (2007). The higher 
probability of liquidity crisis would lead to the higher outward FPI relative to the outward FDI, 
which supports the asset-liquidity hypothesis. The reason is that the higher liquidity risk in the 
source country increases the probability that investors from the source country may face liquidity 
shock and hence would not hold their investment until maturity. If that is the case, then those 
investors would lose from holding FDI since the selling price of FDI before maturity is lower 
than that of FPI due to information asymmetry. Such conjecture is supported by the positive 
coefficient of the instrumented liquidity crisis variable in the regressions of the outward FPI to 
the outward FDI. This result holds when using the liquidity crisis severity as well as the liquidity 
crisis dummy as the instrumented explanatory variables. 
While the asset-liquidity hypothesis infers that the higher liquidity risk will result in the 
higher ratio of outward FPI to FDI, the strategic complementarity hypothesis indicates that the 
higher liquidity risk may in turn decrease the ratio of outward FPI to FDI if a country initially 
has high proportion of direct investors. In order to investigate whether the strategic 
complementarity hypothesis is consistent with the data, the ratio of outward FPI to FDI will be 
regressed on both the instrumented liquidity crisis variable and the interaction term between the 
instrumented liquidity crisis and the initial portion of direct investment (as well as other control 
variables). The results of the fixed effects and the dynamic panel regressions are shown in Tables 
3.6 and 3.7, respectively. Only the dynamic panel results support the strategic complementarity 
hypothesis (neither the instrumented liquidity crisis nor the interaction term are significant in the 
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fixed effects regressions). In the dynamic panel regressions, the positive coefficient of the 
instrumented liquidity crisis still confirms that the higher liquidity risk is associated with the 
higher outward FPI relative to the outward FDI. On the other hand, the negative coefficient of 
the interaction term indicated that if a country has a higher initial portion of direct investment, 
the increase in liquidity risk will result in the lower ratio of outward FPI to FDI. This coincides 
with the mechanism that the higher proportion of direct investment will mitigate the information 
asymmetry problem and thus the information discount on the price of FDI, reducing the lost in 
selling FDI before maturity. Therefore, when facing the higher liquidity risk, investors would not 
have to reduce the holdings of FDI as much as before. 
To examine the validity of the dynamic panel estimations, the existence of unit root in the 
data of FPI to FDI ratio as well as the presence of higher order auto-correlations must be 
determined. The coefficients of the lagged FPI to FDI in columns 3 and 4 are lower than 1, 
respectively, indicating that there is no unit root. Also, the Arrelano-Bond tests fail to reject the 
null hypothesis of no auto-correlation in the second, third, and fourth orders. Therefore, the 
results of the dynamic panel regressions are valid and support the theoretical predictions. 
 
3.  Effects of Liquidity Risk on Gross Flows of FDI and FPI 
To explore the mechanism of the liquidity crisis and the outward international capital 
more thoroughly, the regression models must also be estimated separately for the levels of the 
outward FDI and the outward FPI.  Both the fixed effects and the dynamic panel estimations for 
the level of the outward FDI portray the same picture.  The results, which are presented in Table 
3.8, indicate that after controlling for the price and other factors (including the lagged quantity in 
the case of dynamic panel estimation), the higher probability of liquidity crisis still has a 
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significant negative effect on the outward FDI, which is in line with the theoretical prediction 
that investors from the source country would want to hold less FDI when facing a higher 
probability of liquidity shock.  However, the coefficients of the instrumented liquidity crisis are 
not significant in the regressions of the outward FPI except for the dynamic panel regression of 
the level of FPI using the severity measure of liquidity crisis as a regressor (see Table 3.9).  
Hence, it appears in the data that the liquidity crisis probability affects the composition of 
outward international capital mainly through the channel of outward FDI. 
Overall, the findings about the effects of the liquidity risk on the prices, the compositions, 
and the levels of FPI and FDI are consistent with one another and support the theoretical 
predictions. The sale of assets in response to liquidity shock “lemons” problem helps pushing up 
the relative prices of FDI and FPI. More importantly, because of informational discount on the 
price of FDI, the rise in liquidity risk tends to reduce the holdings of FDI, thereby increasing the 
ratio of outward FPI and outward FDI. Nevertheless, if the proportion of direct investors is 
higher, the reduced “lemons” problem will drive up the demand of FDI and thus decrease the FPI 
to FDI ratio. 
 
VIII. Robustness Tests 
1. FDI in the Form of Mergers and Acquisitions 
The interpretation of the above empirical results hinges upon a trade-off between 
efficiency and price discount in the investors' choices of FDI and FPI.  It is not surprising that 
greenfield FDI investment has such attributes, since it implies greater control of investors over 
management, and is less liquid compared to FPI investment because of liquidation price 
discount.  Nevertheless, the portion of FDI investment is also in the form of mergers and 
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acquisitions (henceforth, M&As).  Such portion has recently become larger, as reflected in the 
23.9 percent and 117.6 percent growth rate of net cross-border M&As in developed economies 
and developing economies, respectively (UNCTAD (2011)).  Unlike greenfield FDI, M&As 
imply control over management but they are almost as liquid as FPI.  Thus, the question is 
whether our results would still hold for FDI investment in the form of M&As. 
To tackle the above question, the fixed effects and the dynamic panel regressions of the 
natural log of the outward FDI investment level are addressed in this section.  That is, the 
dependent variable is the natural log of the outward M&A investment.  We use UNCTAD's data 
of cross-border M&A purchases, which are the purchases of companies abroad by home-based 
transnational corporations less the sales of foreign affiliates of home based transnational 
corporations (UNCTAD (2010)).  This data series capture the cross-border M&A investment 
activities by entities in the source countries. 
The results of the regressions on the outward M&As (In Table 3.10) revealed that the 
higher probability of liquidity crisis is associated with the lower level of outward M&As 
(controlling for other factors).  This finding in line with the implication from the regressions on 
the overall outward FDI as well as the theoretical prediction, inferring that investors would 
decide to hold less FDI as they face higher chance of liquidity shock because of the price 
discount disadvantage of FDI. Our results hold not only for greenfield FDI but also for M&As
15
.  
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Actually, the crux of the theory is that price discount arises from information asymmetry.  When an FDI investor sells his 
investment, the market does not know whether he sells it because he experiences liquidity shock or because the investment is no 
longer fruitful.  Such information asymmetry is present regardless of whether an FDI investment is in the form of greenfield or 
M&As. 
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2. Capital Account Openness 
Another factor which potentially may affect a country's FDI and FPI investments is the 
degree of capital account liberalization
16
. Therefore, we include an additional control, the index 
for capital account openness, in the regression analysis.  There are a number of capital account 
openness indices, such as Quinn (1997), Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003), Miniane (2004), and 
Chinn-Ito (2007).  Here we use the Chinn-Ito capital account openness index, since it covers the 
longest data series (from 1970 to 2005). The Chinn-Ito capital account openness index is 
constructed based on the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangement and Exchange 
Restrictions (AREAER).  It consists of four components; the presence of multiple exchange 
rates, the restrictions on current account transactions, the requirement of the surrender of export 
proceeds, and the restrictions on capital account transactions.  The index ranges from 0 to 100, 
where 0 indicates the most restrictive capital account, and 100 indicates the most liberal capital 
account. 
Tables 3.11-3.18 show that adding capital account openness as another control variable 
does not change the main implications of the regression results.  Some of the fixed effect 
regressions on the ratio of the FDI price to the FPI price showed a significant negative 
coefficient of the capital account openness index, but such result is not robust across different 
specifications of liquidity crises (severity and binary variables).The fixed effect regressions on 
the levels of FPI and FDI indicated that the more liberalized capital account is associated with 
more outward FDI and FPI investments, but not the composition of outward equity flows.  
Indeed, regressions on the ratio of FPI and FDI did not reveal the significant effect of capital 
account openness.   
                                                 
16 see Magud, Reihart, and Rogoff (2011), who surveyed 37 empirical studies on the effectiveness of capital controls. 
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IX. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine how the fear of liquidity shocks guides international investors 
in choosing between FPI and FDI. Our hypothesis is based on an information-efficiency trade-off 
(Goldstein and Razin (2006), Kirabaeva (2009)). FDI investors control the management of the 
firms, whereas FPI investors delegate decisions to managers. Consequently, direct investors are 
more informed than portfolio investors about the prospects of projects. As a consequence of a 
better information they are able to manage their projects, and invest in them, more efficiently. 
However, if investors need to liquidate investments, the price they can get will be lower 
whenever buyers know that the seller is more informed.  The paper tests three hypotheses 
concerning foreign equity investment in the presence of liquidity risk. First, the FDI-to-FPI price 
differential is negatively related to liquidity risk (the "Price Discount Hypothesis"). The idea is 
that market participants do not know whether the FDI investor liquidates a firm because of an 
idiosyncratic liquidity shock, or because, as an informed investor, the firm is hit by a 
productivity shock. Second, the FDI-to-FPI composition of foreign equity investment skews 
towards FPI, if investors are expected to experience liquidity shortage in the future (the "Equity-
Composition Hypothesis"). The idea is that because direct investments are more costly to 
liquidate, due to the price discount, the more severe is the expected liquidity shock, the smaller is 
the FDI-to-FPI ratio. Third, the FDI-to-FPI composition of foreign equity flows skews towards 
FDI, the larger are past FDI-to-FPI stocks (the "Strategic Complementarity Hypothesis"). The 
idea is that high liquidity need investors generate a positive information-externality for low 
liquidity need investors among investors who choose FDI, and further increases in the number of 
FDI investors comes from mainly high liquidity need investors. Such an increase reinforces the 
 70 
 
information externality, thereby lowering the FDI-to-FPI price discount, creating further 
incentives for investors to choose FDI.  The paper brings these hypotheses to country level data 
consisting of a large set of developed and developing countries over the period 1970 to 2004. 
The evidence gives strong support to the hypotheses: greater liquidity risk increases the price 
discount, has a negative effect on gross flows of FDI, and has a positive effect on the ratio 
between FPI and FDI. 
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X. Appendix B 
 
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables, Variables of Interest, Instruments, 
and Controls 
Summary Statistics For Dependent Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ln(outward FPI / outward FDI) 1708 -0.98 1.72 -8.32 4.36 
ln(outward FDI) 2199 6.44 3.39 -3.91 15.01 
ln(outward FPI) 1753 6.25 3.44 -4.61 14.74 
ln(inward FPI / inward FDI) 1725 -2.13 1.95 -11.47 2.89 
ln(inward FDI) 2475 8.07 2.29 1.42 14.84 
ln(inward FPI) 1725 6.81 3.41 -3.91 14.54 
 
Summary Statistics For Variables of Interest 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Liquidity crisis dummy 2436 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Liquidity crisis dummy*(FDI/all inward 
capital)i,t-1 
2235 0.16 0.35 0 1 
Truncated liquidity crisis severity 2399 0.02 0.09 0 2.73 
Truncated liquidity crisis 
severity*(FDI/all inward capital)i,t-1 
2232 0.02 0.10 0 2.73 
 
Summary Statistics For Instruments 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Current Account Balance/GDP 2463 -2.26 6.32 -28.76 22.42 
Govt. Budget Balance/GDP 1892 -0.03 0.05 -1 0.19 
ICRG financial risk index 1602 35.13 8.50 10 50 
ICRG political risk index 1602 67.31 14.81 27 97 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics For Controls 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log of GDP 1723 5.90 2.96 -4.61 14.65 
Log of GDP Per 
Capita  
1716 8.04 1.52 4.82 10.79 
Log of Stock Market 
Capitalization 
1108 -1.55 1.36 -8.46 1.57 
Trade Openness 1680 4.16 0.56 2.53 5.93 
Real Exchange Rate 1199 103.82 24.99 41.75 354.96 
Lag of Real 
Exchange Rate 
1189 4.63 0.22 3.73 5.87 
GDP deflator 1715 1517.7 14680.7 1.00E-07 314948.7 
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Table 3.2: Pair-Wise Correlations between the Variables of Interest and the Instruments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.3: The Effect of the Liquidity Crisis on the FDI to FPI Price Ratio (Fixed Effects) 
 Severity Binary 
Instrumented liquidity crisis -48.29** -5.05** 
 20.97 2.12 
Log of GDP -0.31 -2.43 
 0.19 2.76 
Log of GDP per capita (constant price) 3.74*** 2.52** 
 1.39 1.17 
GDP deflator 0.010 -0.003 
 0.028 0.027 
Numbers of observation 458 458 
Numbers of countries 47 47 
Underidentification test                                      
(Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic) 
5.769 7.21 
P-value 0.0559 0.0655 
Sargan Statistic                                      
(overidentification test of all instruments) 
1.895 4.258 
P-value 0.1686 0.1189 
 
The dependent variable is the log of the price of FDI over the price of FPI.  The country and time fixed 
effects are included in both equations.  The italic numbers are the standard deviations. 
 
 
 
 
Current 
account 
balance 
to GDP 
Government 
budget 
balance to 
GDP 
Percentage 
of short-
term debt 
ICRG 
financial 
risk 
index 
ICRG 
political 
risk 
index 
Liquidity crisis 
dummy 
-0.1722 -0.1266 -0.0108 -0.2576 -0.2553 
Liquidity crisis 
dummy*Initial 
inward FDI portion 
-0.1157 -0.0112 0.035 -0.0983 -0.1362 
Truncated liquidity 
crisis severity 
-0.1094 -0.0655 0.0196 -0.207 -0.1958 
Liquidity crisis 
severity*Initial 
inward FDI portion 
-0.1088 0.0015 0.0281 -0.1289 -0.1496 
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Table 3.4: The Effect of the Liquidity Crisis and the Initial Direct Investment Portion on 
the FDI Price to FPI Price Ratio 
 Severity Binary  
Instrumented liquidity crisis  -47.49** -12.03** 
 22.10 5.32 
Instrumented liquidity crisis*initial direct investment 
portion 
258.96* 36.41* 
 153.57 22.12 
Initial direct investment portion -0.57 1.53 
 1.83 4.11 
Log of GDP -4.62*** -8.10** 
 1.07 2.59 
Log of GDP per capita (constant price) 4.42** 11.25*** 
 1.89 4.28 
GDP deflator 38.21*** 61.63*** 
 11.69 23.05 
Numbers of observation 356 343 
Numbers of countries 40 39 
Underidentification test                                             
(Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic) 
5.843 5.168 
P-value 0.0538 0.0755 
Sargan Statistic (overidentification test of all 
instruments) 
0.155 1.097 
P-value 0.6935 0.2949 
 
The dependent variable is the log of the price of FDI over the price of FPI.  The country and time fixed 
effects are included in both equations.  The italic numbers are the standard deviations. 
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Table 3.5: The Effect of the Liquidity Crisis on the Outward FPI to FDI Ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fixed Effects Dynamic Panel 
 Severity Binary Severity Binary 
Instrumented liquidity crisis 17.40* 1.10* 2.30** 0.35* 
 8.92 0.67 0.93 0.93 
Log of GDP -1.83** -1.96** -0.02* -0.02 
 0.93 0.79 0.01 0.01 
Log of GDP per capita 
(constant price) 
-2.06*** -2.69*** -0.01 -0.01 
 0.40 0.40 0.04 0.04 
Log of stock market 
capitalization 
0.23*** 0.16** -0.01 -0.01 
 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.03 
Trade openness -1.11*** -1.25*** -0.04 -0.04 
 0.31 0.27 0.04 0.04 
Real exchange rate (lag) -2.56*** -2.28*** -0.21 -0.21 
 0.38 0.28 -0.19 0.19 
GDP deflator -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.001** -0.001** 
 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
Lag of outward FPI to FDI 
ratio 
  0.91*** 0.91*** 
   0.03 0.03 
Numbers of observation 694 719 330 337 
Numbers of countries 56 56 31 31 
Underidentification test                               
(Anderson canon. corr. LM 
statistic) 
11.005 16.288   
P-value 0.027 0.0003   
Sargan Statistic                                  
(overidentification test of all 
instruments) 
4.845 2.206   
P-value 0.184 0.138   
Hansen test of overid. 
restrictions 
  8.740 0.020 
P-value   0.120 1.000 
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Table 3.6: The Effect of Liquidity Crisis and Initial Direct Investment Portion on the 
Outward FPI to FDI Ratio (Fixed Effects) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Severity Binary 
Instrumented liquidity crisis  -15.04 -0.45 
 12.36 0.75 
Instrumented liquidity crisis*initial direct 
investment portion 
-22.95 -0.89 
 68.95 4.13 
Initial direct investment portion -3.90*** -4.72*** 
 0.63 0.88 
Log of GDP -0.30*** -0.43*** 
 0.09 0.16 
Log of GDP per capita (constant price) 0.29 0.17 
 0.62 0.66 
Log of stock market capitalization 0.39*** 0.27** 
 0.09 0.12 
Trade openness -0.69* -1.13* 
 0.37 0.59 
Real exchange rate (lag) -0.79** -0.24 
 0.37 0.44 
GDP deflator -0.004 -0.002 
 0.002 0.002 
Numbers of observation 497 199 
Numbers of countries 51 27 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. 
corr. LM statistic) 
6.074 10.122 
P-value 0.108 0.018 
Sargan Statistic (overidentification test of all 
instruments) 
3.208 1.986 
P-value 0.201 0.370 
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Table 3.7: The Effect of Liquidity Crisis and Initial Direct Investment Portion on the 
Outward FPI to FDI Ratio (Dynamic Panel) 
 Severity Binary 
Instrumented liquidity crisis  2.03*** 0.42* 
 0.58 0.58 
Instrumented liquidity crisis*initial direct investment 
portion 
-12.47** -12.47* 
 5.87 5.87 
Initial direct investment portion 0.25 0.25 
 0.23 0.23 
Log of GDP -0.02** -0.02* 
 0.01 0.01 
Log of GDP per capita (constant price) 0.04* 0.04** 
 0.02 0.02 
Log of stock market capitalization 0.00 0.00 
 0.03 0.03 
Trade openness 0.01 0.01 
 0.04 0.04 
Real exchange rate (lag) -0.30* -0.30 
 0.17 0.17 
GDP deflator -0.0009** -0.0009** 
 0.0004 0.0004 
Lag of outward FPI to FDI ratio 0.90*** 0.90*** 
 0.04 0.04 
Numbers of observation 499 495 
Numbers of countries 54 54 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions 16.49 16.53 
P-value 0.124 0.123 
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Table 3.8: The Effect of the Liquidity Crisis on the Level of the Outward FDI 
 Fixed Effects Dynamic Panel 
 Severity Binary Severity Binary 
Instrumented liquidity crisis  -19.20** -1.88** -0.67* -0.74* 
 9.01 0.90 0.37 0.37 
Log of GDP -0.66 -0.54 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 0.82 0.80 0.01 0.01 
Log of GDP per capita (constant 
price) 
2.68* 2.54*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
 0.37 0.36 0.03 0.03 
Log of stock market capitalization 0.04 0.11* 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02 
Trade openness 0.67** 0.57** -0.09** -0.09*** 
 0.27 0.26 0.03 0.03 
Real exchange rate (lag) 1.56*** 1.04*** 0.08 0.08 
 0.32 0.24 -0.08 0.08 
GDP deflator 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.0003 0.0004 
 0.002 0.002 0.0003 0.0003 
Lag of the level of outward FDI   0.95*** 0.95*** 
   0.01 0.01 
Numbers of observation 760 787 394 410 
Numbers of countries 58 59 32 32 
Underidentification test                                          
(Anderson canon. corr. LM 
statistic) 
7.946 7.798   
P-value 0.047 0.0203   
Sargan Statistic                              
(overidentification test of all 
instruments) 
1.536 0.639   
P-value 0.464 0.424   
Hansen test of overid. restrictions   13.320 9.770 
P-value   0.206 0.202 
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Table 3.9: The Effect of Liquidity Crisis on the Level of the Outward FPI 
 Fixed Effects Dynamic Panel 
 Severity Binary Severity Binary 
Instrumented liquidity crisis  -1.65 -0.05 1.36** 0.19 
 5.44 0.44 0.65 0.65 
Log of GDP -2.21*** -2.17*** 0.00 0.00 
 0.57 0.55 0.01 0.01 
Log of GDP per capita (constant 
price) 
0.62** 0.60** 0.06 0.06 
 0.24 0.25 0.05 0.05 
Log of stock market 
capitalization 
0.31*** 0.32*** 0.05 0.05 
 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Trade openness  -0.35* -0.34* -0.14** -0.14*** 
 0.19 0.19 0.06 0.06 
Real exchange rate (lag) -0.78*** -0.82*** -0.09 -0.09 
 0.23 0.19 -0.13 0.13 
GDP deflator -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Lag of the level of outward FPI   0.93*** 0.93*** 
   0.05 0.05 
Numbers of observation 695 696 343 343 
Numbers of countries 56 56 31 31 
Underidentification test                           
(Anderson canon. corr. LM 
statistic) 
10.873 16.660   
P-value 0.012 0.0008   
Sargan Statistic                            
(overidentification test of all 
instruments) 
1.609 1.706   
P-value 0.447 0.426   
Hansen test of overid. 
restrictions 
  4.230 3.330 
P-value   0.836 0.912 
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Table 3.10: The Effect of Liquidity Crisis on the Level of the M&As 
 Fixed Effects Dynamic Panel 
 Severity Binary Severity Binary 
Instrumented liquidity crisis  -34.86 -6.95* -7.87* -0.73* 
 32.02 4.2 4.1 0.44 
Log of GDP -1.09 -4.2 -0.03 -0.009 
 3.03 4.12 0.08 0.09 
Log of GDP per capita (constant 
price) 
4.55*** 4.94*** 0.11 0.21 
 1.2 1.6 0.35 0.39 
Log of stock market capitalization 0.42** 0.63** 1.00*** 1.20*** 
 0.19 0.29 0.29 0.3 
Trade openness  -0.76 -1.26 -0.74** -0.89** 
 1.21 1.43 0.33 0.4 
Real exchange rate (lag) -1.47* -2.44** -1.92** -2.02** 
 0.81 1.13 0.71 0.82 
GDP deflator -0.0048 -0.0001 0.0095*** 0.0135*** 
 0.006 0.008 0.003 0.003 
Lag of the level of M&As   0.17* -0.061 
   0.1 0.08 
Numbers of observation 597 598 210 210 
Numbers of countries 55 55 28 23 
Underidentification test                           
(Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic) 
6.147 5.188   
P-value 0.1 0.0747   
Sargan Statistic                            
(overidentification test of all 
instruments) 
3.949 0.076   
P-value 0.139 0.783   
Hansen test of overid. restrictions   12.99 13.74 
P-value   0.224 0.132 
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Table 3.11: The Effect of Liquidity Crisis on the FDI to FPI Price Ratio (Fixed Effects with 
Capital Account Openness) 
 Severity Binary 
Instrumented liquidity crisis  -47.71** -5.21** 
 16.86 2.06 
Log of GDP -5.66* -2.33 
 3.25 2.84 
Log of GDP per capita (constant price) 3.65*** 2.82** 
 1.35 1.28 
GDP deflator 0.012 0.0001 
 0.03 0.03 
Capital account openness -0.30** -0.17 
 0.14 0.12 
Numbers of observation 448 448 
Numbers of countries 47 47 
Underidentification test                                      
(Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic) 
8.766 8.037 
P-value 0.033 0.018 
Sargan Statistic                                      
(overidentification test of all instruments)       
4.422 1.172 
P-value 0.11 0.279 
 
The dependent variable is the log of the price of FDI over the price of FPI.  The country and time fixed 
effects are included in both equations.  The italic numbers are the standard deviations. 
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Table 3.12: The Effect of Liquidity Crisis and Initial Direct Investment Portion on the FDI 
Price to FPI Price Ratio (Fixed Effects with Capital Account Openness) 
 Severity Binary 
Instrumented liquidity crisis  -50.71** -16.39** 
 25.75 7.01 
Instrumented liquidity crisis*initial direct 
investment portion 
303.56* 57.06** 
 172.12 27.6 
Initial direct investment portion -1.32 -0.86 
 1.89 4.93 
Log of GDP -5.12*** -9.97*** 
 1.2 3.33 
Log of GDP per capita (constant price) 4.74** 14.21** 
 2.3 6.05 
GDP deflator 47.31*** 83.72*** 
 12.84 31.06 
Capital account openness -0.17 -0.48* 
 0.14 0.28 
Numbers of observation 345 333 
Numbers of countries 40 39 
Underidentification test                                             
(Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic) 
5.916 6.176 
P-value 0.05 0.1 
Sargan Statistic (overidentification test of all 
instruments) 
0.607 0.719 
P-value 0.436 0.699 
 
The dependent variable is the log of the price of FDI over the price of FPI.  The country and time fixed 
effects are included in both equations.  The italic numbers are the standard deviations 
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Table 3.13: The Effect of Liquidity Crisis on the Outward FPI to FDI Ratio (with Capital 
Account Openness) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fixed Effects Dynamic Panel 
 Severity Binary Severity Binary 
Instrumented liquidity crisis  17.41* 1.21* 2.11* 0.15 
 9.13 0.69 1.18 0.19 
Log of GDP -2.26** -2.24*** -0.03** -0.03** 
 0.97 0.84 0.01 0.01 
Log of GDP per capita (constant 
price) 
-2.18*** -2.82*** 0.05 0.04 
 0.4 0.41 0.03 0.03 
Log of stock market capitalization 0.25*** 0.16** 0.009 0.004 
 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.03 
Trade openness  -1.12*** -1.25*** -0.07 -0.07 
 0.31 0.28 0.05 0.05 
Real exchange rate (lag) -2.46*** -2.22*** -0.32* -0.29* 
 0.39 0.3 0.16 0.17 
GDP deflator -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.001** -0.001** 
 0.002 0.002 0.0004 0.0004 
Capital account openness -0.06 -0.03 -0.003 0.001 
 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02 
Lag of outward FPI to FDI ratio   0.83*** 0.83*** 
   0.04 0.03 
Numbers of observation 684 709 656 666 
Numbers of countries 56 56 57 57 
Underidentification test                               
(Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic) 
10.458 16.162   
P-value 0.0334 0.0003   
Sargan Statistic                                  
(overidentification test of all 
instruments) 
3.6 2.101   
P-value 0.308 0.147   
Hansen test of overid. restrictions   6.82 5.07 
P-value   0.448 0.535 
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Table 3.14: The Effect of Liquidity Crisis and Initial Direct Investment Portion on the 
Outward FPI to FDI Ratio (Fixed Effects with Capital Account Openness) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Severity Binary 
Instrumented liquidity crisis  -17.22 0.18 
 14.51 0.7 
Instrumented liquidity crisis*initial direct 
investment portion 
-23.72 -4.5 
 75.88 3.79 
Initial direct investment portion -4.02*** -4.79*** 
 0.68 0.86 
Log of GDP -0.33*** -0.47*** 
 0.11 0.16 
Log of GDP per capita (constant price) 0.34 0.24 
 0.69 0.65 
Log of stock market capitalization 0.42*** 0.24* 
 0.1 0.12 
Trade openness -0.68* -0.67* 
 0.4 0.59 
Real exchange rate (lag) -0.73* -0.3 
 0.4 0.42 
GDP deflator -0.003 -0.001 
 0.003 0.002 
Capital account openness 0.07 0.11** 
 0.05 0.05 
Numbers of observation 487 196 
Numbers of countries 51 27 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. 
LM statistic) 
6.074 10.77 
P-value 0.082 0.013 
Sargan Statistic (overidentification test of all 
instruments) 
0.201 2.223 
P-value 0.654 0.329 
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Table 3.15: The Effect of Liquidity Crisis and Initial Direct Investment Portion on the 
Outward FPI to FDI Ratio (Dynamic Panel with Capital Account Openness) 
 Severity Binary 
Instrumented liquidity crisis  2.02*** 0.43* 
 0.54 0.25 
Instrumented liquidity crisis*initial direct 
investment portion 
-11.32* -1.29* 
 6.42 0.67 
Initial direct investment portion 0.3 0.37 
 0.23 0.23 
Log of GDP -0.02* -0.02* 
 0.01 0.01 
Log of GDP per capita (constant price) 0.12 0.13 
 0.25 0.15 
Log of stock market capitalization -0.002 -0.01 
 0.03 0.02 
Trade openness -0.02 -0.02 
 0.06 0.05 
Real exchange rate (lag) -0.21 -0.21 
 0.31 0.22 
GDP deflator -0.001 -0.001 
 0.001 0.001 
Capital account openness  -0.1 -0.1 
 0.28 0.16 
Lag of outward FPI to FDI ratio 0.90*** 0.90*** 
 0.04 0.04 
Numbers of observation 488 484 
Numbers of countries 53 53 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions 15.14 10.9 
P-value 0.127 0.366 
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Table 3.16: The Effect of Liquidity Crisis on the Level of the Outward FDI (with Capital 
Account Openness) 
 Fixed Effects Dynamic Panel 
 Severity Binary Severity Binary 
Instrumented liquidity crisis  -20.09** -1.89** -0.68* -0.07** 
 9.36 0.92 0.37 0.37 
Log of GDP 0.07 0.12 0.02** 0.02*** 
 0.87 0.85 0.01 0.01 
Log of GDP per capita (constant 
price) 
2.89*** 2.74*** 0.07** 0.06*** 
 0.38 0.35 0.03 0.03 
Log of stock market capitalization 0.01 0.09 0.06*** 0.05*** 
 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02 
Trade openness 0.70** 0.62** -0.08* -0.09** 
 0.28 0.26 0.03 0.03 
Real exchange rate (lag) 1.37*** 0.88*** 0.07 0.04 
 0.33 0.25 0.08 0.08 
GDP deflator 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.0004 0.0003 
 0.002 0.002 0.0003 0.0003 
Capital account openness 0.15*** 0.13*** -0.00003 -0.0005 
 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.01 
Lag of the level of outward FDI   0.95*** 0.95*** 
   0.01 0.01 
Numbers of observation 750 777 391 391 
Numbers of countries 58 59 32 32 
Underidentification test                                          
(Anderson canon. corr. LM 
statistic) 
7.662 7.496   
P-value 0.054 0.024   
Sargan Statistic                              
(overidentification test of all 
instruments) 
3.134 0.002   
P-value 0.209 0.962   
Hansen test of overid. restrictions   10.63 12.03 
P-value   0.387 0.15 
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Table 3.17: The Effect of Liquidity Crisis on the Level of the Outward FPI (with Capital 
Account Openness) 
 Fixed Effects Dynamic Panel 
 Severity Binary Severity Binary 
Instrumented liquidity crisis  -3.12 -0.15 1.33 0.13 
 5.53 0.58 1.03 0.19 
Log of GDP -1.91*** -2.09*** 0.0002 0.001 
 0.58 0.62 0.01 0.01 
Log of GDP per capita (constant 
price) 
0.74*** 0.43* 0.11* 0.11* 
 0.25 0.25 0.06 0.06 
Log of stock market capitalization 0.30*** 0.28*** 0.09* 0.09* 
 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Trade openness  -0.33* -0.11 -0.18** -0.18*** 
 0.19 0.18 0.08 0.06 
Real exchange rate (lag) -0.90* -0.44** -0.21 -0.17 
 0.24 0.2 0.08 0.15 
GDP deflator -0.001 -0.0002 -0.001 -0.001 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Capital account openness 0.11*** 0.08** -0.04 -0.04 
 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
Lag of the level of outward FPI   0.87*** 0.88*** 
   0.06 0.05 
Numbers of observation 685 715 339 339 
Numbers of countries 56 57 31 31 
Underidentification test                           
(Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic) 
10.35 9.636   
P-value 0.016 0.022   
Sargan Statistic                            
(overidentification test of all 
instruments) 
4.364 4.466   
P-value 0.113 0.11   
Hansen test of overid. restrictions   1.65 1.42 
P-value   0.977 0.965 
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Table 3.18: The Effect of Liquidity Crisis on the Level of the M&As (with Capital Account 
Openness) 
 Fixed Effects Dynamic Panel 
 Severity Binary Severity Binary 
Instrumented liquidity crisis  -28.09 -7.17* -8.19** -0.79* 
 29.39 4.38 4.08 0.46 
Log of GDP -0.42 -3.08 -0.03 -0.013 
 2.91 4.25 0.09 0.09 
Log of GDP per capita (constant 
price) 
4.82*** 5.33*** 0.07 0.19 
 2.91 1.68 0.38 0.42 
Log of stock market capitalization 0.38** 0.62** 1.00*** 1.20*** 
 0.18 0.3 0.3 0.31 
Trade openness  -0.55 -1.28 -0.74** -0.87** 
 1.15 1.48 0.34 0.41 
Real exchange rate (lag) -1.84** -2.76** -2.04** -2.18** 
 0.79 1.19 0.85 0.92 
GDP deflator -0.005 -0.0004 -0.009*** 0.013*** 
 0.005 0.009 0.003 0.003 
Capital account openness 0.19* 0.18 0.07 0.04 
 0.12 0.16 0.22 0.23 
Lag of the level of M&As   0.17* -0.06 
   0.09 0.08 
Numbers of observation 588 589 208 208 
Numbers of countries 55 55 28 28 
Underidentification test                           
(Anderson canon. corr. LM 
statistic) 
6.736 4.936   
P-value 0.081 0.085   
Sargan Statistic                            
(overidentification test of all 
instruments) 
4.131 0.003   
P-value 0.127 0.954   
Hansen test of overid. restrictions   12.65 9.66 
P-value   0.244 0.379 
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